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Merchants from Tientsin have flourished as far north as the city of Kulja in the Ili Valley. Nearly twenty years ago a British observer remarked that "successful merchants at Kulja come from the towns of Tou Liu and Yang Liu Ch'ing near Tientsin; the commerce of Ili has been kept in the families for generations, and considering the numbers of relations and connections every Chinese has, it is not to be wondered at that Tientsin people form a whole community, ranging from barbers to landowners, at Kulja." [11]

Ever since Sinkiang became a province a small Chinese minority has ruled it by the indirect methods which many colonial governments have found effective. The traditional Uighur and Kazakh and Mongol feudal structures have been left more or less undisturbed, with the existing Begs and princes used as instruments of Chinese rule. In Sinkiang, just as in Sikang and the southernmost parts of Yunnan, the result of this indirect rule is an administration with a Chinese upper stratum and an indigenous lower stratum. The chief defect of this system is that instead of promoting political and administrative progress, it fortifies and preserves the feudal system, and hinders the evolution of a more modern form of society.

While bribery, corruption and venality are almost endemic in the lower stratum of administration, the quality of the upper administration is naturally subject to the policy of the governor or the chairman of the provincial government. At this top level Chinese policy has passed through three distinct stages. From 1884 to 1933 there was a period of about half a century dominated by an old-fashioned feudal bureaucracy. Governor Yang Tseng-hsin and Governor Chin Shu-jen can best be described as the last of the old imperial bureaucrats, though both served under the Chinese Republic. Then followed a decade of war lord rule from 1933 to 1944, under General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, whose policy was at first liberal and later harshly repressive. Finally, from 1944 until Sinkiang became enveloped by Chinese Communism on the east as well as Russian Communism on the west,

[11] *Journal of the Central Asian Society*, Jan. 1931, Vol. 18, pt. 1, p. 140.

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Kuomintang policy in this frontier region can best be described as one of fitful opportunism in the face of chronic emergency.

Feudal Bureaucracy, 1884

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Of all the feudal bureaucrats in Sinkiang the most able was Yang Tseng-hsin. He was born in Yunnan, though his family originally moved there from Nanking. After having successfully passed the Imperial Civil Service Examinations, he was appointed district magistrate in Kansu and later promoted to be prefecture head and regional administrative head (Taot'ai) in that province. His record was so good that it attracted the attention of Wang Shu-t'ang, Commissioner of Civil Affairs in Sinkiang, who recommended his appointment as Taot'ai of the Aksu region. Still later he became Taot'ai (Intendant of the Circuit) of Urumchi and Barkul. In 1912, after disturbances accompanying the Chinese Revolution, the Governor of Sinkiang resigned and made Yang Tseng-hsin his successor. Yang negotiated with separatist leaders in Ili, prevented a Moslem revolt in Komul, quickly suppressed a rebellion of the Ko Lao Hui (Elder Brethren) secret society in the Tarim Basin, and unified the whole provincial administration.

Most of the important military and police officers under Yang were from Yunnan. These were young men, enthusiastic about the new Chinese Republic. When in 1916 General Ts'ai Ao in their distant home province of Yunnan raised the banner of revolt against Yuan Shih-k'ai's attempt to set up a monarchy, they wanted to join the Republican movement. Because Yang Tseng-hsin refused to join, they plotted to kill him, but the plot was discovered by one of his intelligence agents. The steps that Yang then took showed his alertness and cunning.

First he called the Yunnanese officials before him to answer the charge. When they denied it, he executed his own intelligence agent to convince them that he believed they had been falsely accused. He then had their families moved into his own residential quarters. Shortly afterward, when he had to entertain an inspector from the Peking Ministry of Education, he invited all

Kirghiz
Mongol

*563 Kirghiz is a Turkic language, more closely related to Chaghatai
197 Turkish and Uighur than to Kazakh. The same language is spoken
212 by the Kirghiz on the Soviet side of the frontier. Like the Kazakhs, the Kirghiz in Sinkiang are almost completely illiterate, and the only written form for the language is the Arabic alphabet; while in Soviet Kirghizia, illiteracy has decreased sharply with the introduction of the new Kirghiz alphabet, originally based on the Latin script but now using an adapted Cyrillic script.

Like the Kazakhs, the Kirghiz are nominal Mohammedans but with strong shamanistic holdovers. Radlov, a century ago, maintained that they considered themselves to be exemplary Moslems and were less tolerant of non-Moslems than the Kazakhs. This is evidenced in their folk literature in which the struggle against nonbelievers plays an important role.

*563 *Mongols.* The Mongols of Sinkiang, numbering some 63,000
101 people, are badly split up and unevenly distributed in widely
361 separated sections of the province. The largest concentrations are in the Chuguchak and Ili administrative regions, in each of which they number almost 25,000. Another group totaling about 13,000 is found in the highlands of the Kharashahr region. There are a few along the northeastern section of the frontier between Sinkiang and the Mongolian People's Republic, and other scattered fragments in the northern part of the province.

*563 The area most clearly dominated by the Mongols is along the
131 western end of the frontier with the Mongolian People's Repub-
361 lic. Yet the Mongols in this region constitute only a small fraction of the total number in the province, while the areas in which they are most heavily concentrated, such as Chuguchak and Ili, are in turn dominated by Kazakhs.

*563 The geographic fragmentation of the Mongols is explained
361 largely by their historical vicissitudes. They are divided into three
174 major tribal groups: (1) the Western Mongols, who include the Ölöts, the Torguts, and the Khoshots; (2) the Chahar Mongols, and (3) the Urianghai Mongols; but the political units do not
*563 correspond with these tribal divisions. The Mongols are adminis-
631 tratively organized into three leagues and two special groups.

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Mongol

The Unen Susuktu League is made up of ten banners of Torguts who are widely distributed and separated from each other by non-Mongol peoples. The most important Torgut group is in the Tien Shan above the oasis of Kharashahr; others are on the northern skirts of the Tien Shan, and others on the southern slopes of the Altai. The Bato Setkhiltu League is composed of three banners of Khoshots on the Yulduz Plateau, in the heart of the central Tien Shan. The Ching Setkhiltu League includes three banners of Khoshots and seven of Urianghai, all located in the Chuguchak-Altai area. The two groups which are not included in "leagues" are the Chahars, who live in the Borotala Valley, on the way from Urumchi to Kulja, and the Ölöts, in the valleys of the Tekes and Kash Rivers in the Ili region. These complications of the league-and-banner system illustrate how effective it was as a Manchu-invented administrative device for weakening political unity among the Mongols.

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Of the various tribal divisions of the Sinkiang Mongols, the Chahars were brought to Sinkiang from their old pastures in what is now Chahar Province in Inner Mongolia, shortly after the Manchus conquered Jungaria in the eighteenth century. As strangers who would not combine easily with the Western Mongols, they were strategically placed to command the main route between Urumchi and Ili. The Urianghai of Sinkiang are also not Western Mongols. As their name indicates, they are related to the tribes of the territory formerly called "Urianghai," later called "Tannu-Tuva," and eventually annexed by the Soviet Union. They originally spoke a Turkic language, becoming Mongolized only as late as the nineteenth century.

563* 174

All other Sinkiang Mongols are Western Mongols. They are related, by the dialects which they speak and by historical association, to certain tribes of Western Outer Mongolia (Mongolian People's Republic), to the Mongols of Kokonor or Ch'inghai, on the northern side of the Tibetan plateau, and to the Kalmuks of the lower Volga, in Russia. Traditionally, the core of the Western Mongols was a tribe called Oirat, who in the fourteenth century migrated into Sinkiang from the Angara River, which flows

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Mongol

*563 174 out of Lake Baikal into the Yenisei. A number of indications point to the probability that the majority of the Western Mongols are the descendants of tribes which originally were forest tribes and later moved into steppe country, where they became pastoral nomads.

The Western Mongols eventually formed a federation, referred to in the Chinese chronicles as the Oirat Federation, and also known as the Ölöt Federation. (The Mongol written form of Ölöt is *Ughelet.*) In the seventeenth century the Jungar[22] or "left wing" of this federation attempted to conquer the rest of the federation. It is from the Jungars that Jungaria is named. Of those who would not submit to the Jungars a large number, including many Torguts and Khoshots, fought their way westward through territory held by Turkic tribes until they reached the lower Volga, where they became known as "the Kalmuks," probably from a Turkic word meaning "the remnant." Eighty years later the Manchus invaded Sinkiang, defeated and almost annihilated the Jungars, and invited those who had resisted the Jungars to return. Some did, including the ancestors of most of the present Torguts of Sinkiang, while others remained in Russia.

[47] 566 *563 In their economic life the Mongols of Sinkiang closely resemble the Kazakhs of Sinkiang. In their social organization, the hereditary Princes of the Mongols enjoy a much stronger and much more institutionalized feudal power than the sultans of the Kazakh tribes. One result of this difference is that poor Mongols are much poorer than poor Kazakhs. In addition, the Lama Buddhist religion of the Mongols is institutionalized to the point of constituting an ecclesiastical feudalism, with the result that the payment of dues and the making of special gifts for the upkeep of lama monasteries is another principal cause of the impoverishment of the Mongols as compared with the Kazakhs.

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*563 631 Until the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the Mongol Princes had virtual autonomy in administering their tribal territories. Under the Republic, the Chinese authorities have upheld the power

[22] In written Mongol, *jeghun gar*, "left hand"; translated as "left wing." In Mongol, "left" is equivalent to "eastern."

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Mongol
Tadjik

of the Princes over their subjects, but at the same time have steadily increased Chinese control over the Princes themselves. The result of this policy has been to make all progressive Mongols antifeudal as well as anti-Chinese.

Chinese policy has also been to encourage friction between the Mongols and other peoples. Under the long regime of Governor Yang Tseng-hsin from 1912 to 1928 the Kazakhs were provided with arms and were permitted to drive a wedge of expansion into the Altai area in order to separate the Mongols of Sinkiang from their too revolutionary brethren over the border in the Mongolian People's Republic. On the other hand, the Torguts of Kharashahr, geographically separate from other Mongols and close to a region of Kazakh strength, were allowed to develop a well-equipped cavalry force trained by Russian Cossacks who had left Siberia after the Soviet Revolution.

Only recently, with the increase both of nationalism and of the revolutionary trend of nationalism in Sinkiang, have some Mongols and some Kazakhs begun to make common cause. There are sections of both Mongol and Kazakh support for the Kulja coalition and the Kulja program. More revolutionary elements among the Sinkiang Mongols may be expected to look with even greater interest toward the Mongolian People's Republic. No outstanding individuals, however, have been reported among the Mongol nationalists of Sinkiang.

Iranians (*Sarikolis, Tajiks*). In the extreme southwest corner of Sinkiang is a group of people who speak an Iranian tongue. They are concentrated in the Sarikol or Tashkurgan Valley, where they form the majority of the population, and appear in smaller numbers in neighboring areas. All told they number only 8800. They are usually referred to as Sarikolis, but were classified by Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai in his list of the peoples of Sinkiang as Tajiks. Recent Russian writers also called them Tajiks, but it is not clear whether they are following the Chinese classification or whether the Chinese adopted a Russian classification.

The Sarikol Valley lies close to the point where the Chinese,

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Chinese

lem faith, have also settled down in Sinkiang. Many were first placed in Sinkiang by the Manchu Emperor Ch'ien-lung after he had crushed the Jungar Mongols in the eighteenth century. Later other groups of Chinese Moslems sought refuge in the area as the aftermath of Moslem uprisings in the northwestern part of China proper. These are the Dungans (in Chinese transcription, T'ung-kan). Most of them were from Kansu Province, some from Ninghsia, others from Shensi.

So important is the religious factor in distinguishing between Moslem and non-Moslem Chinese that often they are considered as two distinct peoples. In Sheng Shih-ts'ai's classification the main body of Chinese are designated as "Han" and the Moslem Chinese as "Hui." The former number some 202,000, and the latter 92,000. The term "Hui" is short for "Hui-hui"; and, although it derives from a medieval transcription of the name of the Uighurs, it is applied to all Moslems. The term "Dungan," for the Chinese Moslems — used invariably by the Russians in Tsarist times, and also in the Soviet literature dealing with the small colonies of Moslem Chinese in the Kazakh and Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republics — is of Turkic origin. Its meaning is obscure, but it may mean "the returners." This etymology is supported by the folk tradition that the Chinese Moslems are the descendants of mercenary troops who entered China from Inner Asia and later settled down and took Chinese wives. Thus when they were moved westward again, into Sinkiang, in the eighteenth century, they were said to be "returning" toward their ancient homes.

Like the main body of Chinese, those of Moslem faith are to be found in many cities of Sinkiang but chiefly in those in the northern part of the province. They are also important in the caravan trade, in the running of inns and caravanserais, and in the military forces. Some have also taken to the land.

Enjoying a virtual monopoly of the provincial administration, the non-Moslem Chinese have upheld the bureaucratic tradition of scholarship and learning. Apart from the official class, however, the Chinese in Sinkiang appear to be no less illiterate than those in the rest of China. Illiteracy is especially high among the

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Chinese

*563 631 212 Moslems because such scholarly incentives as exist among them consist mainly of acquiring a modicum of ability to read the Koran in Arabic.

*563 562 779 The influence of Islam on the status of women appears to be somewhat less baleful. Sinkiang Moslem women generally enjoy more freedom than their sisters in Islamic countries of the Near East, and those who belong to the Chinese Moslem community rank high in this respect. The institution of purdah, for example, does not exist among them.

*563 779 186 668 [602] The most marked influence of Islam among the Chinese has been as a political force, to unite those of Moslem faith against Chinese not of the faith. Chinese Moslem society is even stronger in patriarchal authority and clan loyalty than "heathen" Chinese society. The principle that well-to-do members of a clan have a responsibility for the welfare of their poorer distant relatives, as well as advantages over them, is given a heightened authority among Moslem Chinese by the feeling that they form a minority which must keep its ranks closed; whereas among non-Moslem Chinese, the precept is often honored but not conscientiously observed. In times of civil war and peasant rebellion, especially, Moslem war lord armies normally combine military discipline and community loyalty: they are not merely troops and officers, but clansmen and chieftains. Even in periods of widespread peasant unrest, therefore, the leaders of the Chinese Moslem communities are usually able to lead Moslem peasants against both non-Moslem peasants and non-Moslem landlords. Often what starts as a Moslem peasant revolt is taken over by Moslem landlords and converted into a movement to expand the whole Moslem community against the non-Moslem community, and to prevent the Moslem community from being infiltrated either by Chinese nationalism or by ideas of social revolution.

*563 578 186 The essentially nonreligious character of the internecine wars among the two main groups of Chinese in Sinkiang, however, in spite of the appeal to Islam in closing the ranks of the Chinese Moslems, is indicated by the failure of the Moslem Chinese to establish anything more than temporary alliances with their co-

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312 A unique irrigation device was introduced into the oasis of
133 Komul by the Chinese administrator Chang Yao in the nineteenth century. Because of the exceptionally porous sandy soil in this oasis, he had water carried for miles across the desert in wooden troughs lined with felt. This device is too expensive for present costs.

Although agriculture in northern Sinkiang is also irrigated, cultivation is not so sharply isolated in oases as it is in the south. The main water supply for irrigation comes from the Ili, Manass, and Black Irtish rivers.

Of these the Ili is formed by the confluence of three rivers, the Kash, the Kunges, and the Tekes. The volume discharged by these three rivers at high water is 100 cubic meters per second for the Kash and Tekes and 30 cubic meters per second for the Kunges.

133 The Manass is a slow river, but when in flood it is troublesome.
731 It cuts extra flood channels which discharge into marshes just below the Manass oasis, and consequently its terminal lake, Telli Nor, farther out in the plain, is steadily drying up.

The headwaters of the Irtish are in the Altai, where the snow level is much lower than in the Tien Shan. The spring flood therefore comes down six weeks earlier on the Irtish than it does on the Manass, which is beneficial for spring planting.

312 Wherever irrigation is practiced, water rights are even more
631 fundamental than land ownership. In Sinkiang, there are two
423 bodies of custom and practice with regard to water. One is associated with the *kariz*. The other prevails much more widely, has a complicated history, and a number of variants.

The rights, obligations, and customs associated with the simple practice of leading water in ditches from rivers undoubtedly go back to the ancient form of communal enterprise in which all the members of the community contributed their labor, and the water was shared out not to individuals with proprietary rights in particular fields, but to kinship groups cultivating fields to which they had a collective title.

In a community which is still lacking in large-scale private

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money capital, however, it is not surprising that the line at which work actually starts is still determined by the necessity for public labor, which must be assembled and directed by the exercise of public authority in some form. A typical recent example is the digging of an irrigation canal in the small oasis of Chira. As six villages were affected, three hundred men were assembled from these villages under the authority of their own village headmen. The village organization, however, can be superseded by the higher administrative authority of Chinese officials. The general rule is: local undertakings on a moderate scale are carried out within the limits of such co-operation as can be organized by village elders or headmen; enterprise on a large scale requires the intervention of a Chinese official.

At levels below the intervention of Chinese officials, traces of very ancient practices are found. Field investigation in a village in the oasis of Kucha revealed the survival of the "*ketman* of labor," a concept which combines units of labor, land, and water. The *ketman* is a broad-bladed mattock, the most ancient Inner Asian agricultural tool, which to this day is more widely used than the plow. A "*ketman* of labor" is the work of one man contributed throughout the digging of a canal, which entitles him to a "*ketman* of water," enough to irrigate from ten to fourteen acres.

In this village, however, the uniformity of the concept proved not to be reflected in uniformity of water rights. Of the total population about 8 per cent were landlords and rich peasants; but this 8 per cent owned about half of the total water supply. At the other end of the scale 17 per cent of the population had no water rights whatever, and were forced to purchase their water with a share of their crop. In between these two groups, one half of the water was owned by 75 per cent of the households. These families, classified as middle and poor peasants, had rights to an average of one third of a *ketman* of water for each household.

The shuffle which takes place between the contribution of labor and the allocation of water rights is accounted for in various ways. According to the Islamic principle of *mavat*, he who first

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service. In 1812, however, an imperial decree allowed the garrison commander at Kulja to divide the Manchu-held land as permanent private property, exempt from tax. Under the terms of grant, such land was not to be leased to others for cultivation, and if farm hands were hired, they must be Manchus.[23] In the course of time, however, these terms became a dead letter and the land was freely leased and even sold to Chinese cultivators, officials and merchants.

In their main lines the structures of both the settled and the nomad societies of Sinkiang, as administratively revised under the Manchu Empire, outlasted the great Moslem rebellions of the nineteenth century and the Chinese Revolution of 1911. They even proved strong enough to contain the gradual commercialization of economic life during the past hundred years. Only now are they finally breaking down, caught between a securely established socialized state in Soviet territory and a rapidly spreading social revolution in Chinese territory.

As they break apart, these structures reveal a multiple stratification, the layers of which can be classified both socially and historically. Socially, they are graduated from arbitrary powers and privileges at the top to disfranchisement at the bottom. Historically, the stratification is more confused. In the alternating cycles of feudalism centralized under a strong imperial overlordship and feudalism decentralized under local oasis-states and rulers of nomad tribes, the incoming phase never completely swept away and replaced the institutions and administrative practices of the outgoing phase. Some of the characteristics of decentralization always lingered here and there, though unevenly, in the strongest phases of centralization; and conversely, even when oases were most completely independent of each other politically, and nomad tribes rejected the overlordship of other nomad tribes, the larger community of the oasis society as such and the society of the pastoral nomads as such was never entirely obliterated.

[23] *Institutes of the Manchu Dynasty*, edition of 1818, section "*Shih Li*" ("Precedents"), Ch. 842, p. 13 (in Chinese).

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As both societies break up, they first dislodge the top structure of the Chinese administrative bureaucracy. This bureaucracy represents all that is left of the centralizing overlord power of China in Inner Asia. It may soon be succeeded by another bureaucracy, as the Communists take over power in China; but for the moment it is breaking up.

Though for nearly forty years it has been ruling in the name of a Chinese Republic, this bureaucracy is essentially the same, both in its functions and in its lack of function, as that which the Manchus set up in the eighteenth century. Economically, it is a surtax on the total revenue of Sinkiang. Politically and administratively it has functioned to keep Sinkiang the same color on the map and to maintain, internationally, the convention that in Inner Asia the domains of the Chinese touch the domains of the Russians. Yet it has never integrated Sinkiang with China, making the life and wealth of Sinkiang a part of the life and wealth of China. The individual Chinese bureaucrat has returned from Sinkiang wealthy; but the Province of Sinkiang has contributed little to the State of China.

Below their own level, the Chinese cut into but at the same time conserved the feudal powers of the local ruling classes. The village elder, the landholding oasis magnate, the Mongol prince, the Kazakh chief — whatever they might be called — were forced to yield a double tribute: one to maintain the Chinese bureaucracy as such, and one to enrich the individual Chinese bureaucrat; but in order to enable them to yield this tribute, they had to be enabled to collect it, and for this purpose their traditional powers were maintained. In this way the surtax necessary to support the Chinese bureaucracy was in fact collected from the oasis farmer and the nomad herdsman.

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Trade, in spite of the steady penetration of commercialization in the form of a money economy, preserved the essential feudal characteristic of privilege: both the Chinese bureaucrat and under him the "native headmen" prevented the operation of a free market by selecting individual merchants to whom they extended their protection, enabling them to evade taxes and to become

to enthrone puppet or at least "loyal" princes. Political manipulation was followed, or accompanied, by military demonstration where it was needed and where it was possible. The policy of letting "barbarians rule barbarians" early became a cardinal feature of Han-Turkestan relations and, in many ways, it has remained so. This was important in an area so distant as the Western Regions, and in ancient days was practiced to the extent of utilizing one colonial principality in military compaigns against another and to the extreme of "permitting" native personnel to administer localities—though this often seems to have been "allowed" in cases where it could not have been prevented. In instances of severe difficulties whole populations were shifted to distant areas or, where deemed necessary, depopulated by the sword.

The pinnacle of Han administrative achievement on this frontier was the creation of the office of the *Tu-tu*. His job, Chinese history states, was to "watch" a particular outpost. He was, it is evident, an all-around colonial executive and the ancient Chinese counterpart of the Occidental Military Governor of a dependency in the pre-Pearl Harbor epoch.

T'ang Improvements

Where T'ang Chinese considerably improved upon the Han was in their attempt to convert much of the Western Regions into the administrative units used in China Proper—the *chou* and *hsien* (department and county). This meant application of customary Chinese law to the Central Asian frontier, but it did not mean abolition of the office of the Tu-tu. He still administered outlying areas. His duties, however, became in some cases more closely allied with the regional and local government machinery of China Proper than previously. By the new arrangement, also, executive machinery in the Western Regions became exceedingly complicated and broad. At one time this machinery was centered in the Tu-tu prefecture *(Tu-tu Fu)* at An-hsi (in present-day Kansu), with power said to extend from Khotan to Persia, and the following units under its direction: sixteen "states," eighty departments, one hundred eleven counties, and one hundred twenty-six military departments *(chün-fu,* also called *chi-mi chou* or "restrained" departments).

individual from among their number to the office of Concurrent Provincial Chairman. Sheng Shih-ts'ai was appointed to that post in 1940, and he has given it more and more of his attention since the decease of the former Provincial Chairman, Liu Wen-lung. Actually, so far as power is concerned, Sheng Shih-ts'ai seems to have dominated Sinkiang since 1933 through his military strength; the effective participation of other members in the provincial committee seems to have largely been subject to his approval, and in many respects the ratification of his and their appointments by national authorities has been mostly a matter of form.

Statements as to the administrative organization of Sinkiang areas do not always jibe. But Tu Chung-yüan writes, and other authorities seem to substantiate, that there are nine principal administrative regions in the province: Tihwa Ch'ü (including the capital of the same name), I-li Ch'ü, T'a Ch'eng Ch'ü, Ha-mi Ch'ü, A Shan Ch'ü, Yen-ch'i Ch'ü, K'o-shih Ch'ü, and Khotan Ch'ü. According to Tu there are administrative officers over these, each of which includes a number of counties. There are, he states, seventy-two counties in all Sinkiang.

It is hard to tell how effectively this *Ch'ü* and *Hsien* (Region and County) system has been working in Sinkiang. In the past such governmental forms have worked better in the oasis settlements than in the outlying pastures, but have on the whole been subordinated to varying local tribal customs when the two systems came into practical conflict. Where relations between provincial officials and non-Chinese-speaking races have become too complicated, native headmen speaking Chinese have in the past served as "middlemen."

So far as the national allegiance of Sinkiang is concerned, let any doubts be immediately dispelled. The name of the province indicates that it is a part of the territory subject to the laws of the Chinese National Government and the officials and people of both Sinkiang and the Chinese Republic as a whole operate accordingly. Both as Commander-in-Chief of Border Defense and as Provincial Chairman in Sinkiang Sheng Shih-ts'ai is formally an appointee of the Executive Yüan of the Chinese National Government. The fact that he is allotted and accepts such national titles is significant evidence that neither he

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unified government emerged for China." *Ibid.*, p. 276. In turn the Manchu accession to power, according to his view, was a "regeneration of racial sovereignty," though "in a narrow sense." *Ibid.*, II, p. 571.

95. ". . . the important duties of the *Tu-tu* were to watch the Wu-sun and K'ang-chu [ancient principalities in the Chinese Western Regions] and all their activities with foreign states. If practicable these matters were to be handled peaceably; if necessary by force." Chiang Chün-chang, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

95. T'ang: *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

96. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-35; cf. Hung Ti-ch'en, *Hsi-ts'ang Shih Ti Ta Kang* (Cheng Chung Book Company, Nanking, 1936), pp. 148-58.

96-97. Chiang Chün-chang, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-40.

97-98. The quotation is from Tu Chung-yüan, *op. cit.*, p. 76; cf. Lattimore, "Chinese Turkestan," *The Open Court*, XLVII (Chicago, March, 1933), p. 99.

98. "Clean Government" is a free translation of the Chinese term, *Ch'ing-lien;* the Chinese is also translatable more literally as "clean-handedness" or "honesty." Tu Chung-yüan, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77.

99. Administrative Divisions: *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43. Chao Lieh wrote in 1941 that there are twelve administrative districts with a total of seventy-five hsien in Sinkiang. *Loc. cit.*, Wang Tso-cheng, *Chung-kuo fen sheng Hsiang-t'u* (Ya-Kuang Geographical Society, Shanghai, 1939), states instead under "Sinkiang Province" that there are fifty-nine counties and six Provisional Administrative Offices in the province. The Soviet accounts seem, however, to corroborate or to have accepted Tu Chung-yüan's account. *Vide* the *Malaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedia, tom* IX, column 715, which lists nine *okrug* ("district" or "circuit") on its map of "Sinkiang (Western China)," as follows: Kashgarskii okrug (Kashi), Khotanskii okrug (Khetian), Karasharskii okrug (Yanshzi), Aksuiskii okrug, Illiskii okrug (Ili), Urumchinskii okrug (Dikhua), Komul'skii okrug (Khami), Tarbagataiskii okrug, and Altaiskii okrug (Ashan'). *Vide* also Lattimore, "Chinese Turkestan or Sinkiang (Hsinchiang)," *loc. cit.*, pp. 82-83.

100. *Vide supra*, p. 55. *Vide* also, for example, the *New York Times*, June 26, 1937, which cites a Pei-p'ing dispatch stating *inter alia*, that "Russia . . . is keenly interested in maintaining paramountcy in Northern Chinese Turkestan, a territory held strategically vital as a cushion against infiltration of Japanese influence along the Siberian frontiers." The same article refers to the "provincial governor who is considered a Russian puppet . . ." *Vide* also dispatches dated October 22, 1937, and October 10, 1938. The latter states "Russian influence, politically and militarily, is extensive in Sinkiang . . ." Such items from the well considered *New York Times* are mild compared to others that have appeared in less discriminating newspapers.

102. Hedin, *Flights of "Big Horse,"* pp. 156-157. Kara-Khitai: In 1123 a Khitan prince, who swept into Turkestan at the head of a considerable mercenary following, set up the kingdom of Kara-Khitai. Cf. Carruthers, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 356-357; 384; Lattimore, "Chinese Turkestan or Sinkiang (Hsinchiang)," *loc. cit.*, p. 85.

103. Tu Chung-yüan, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

103-104. Chao Lieh, *loc. cit.;* Ch'en Chi-jung, "Hsin Hsin-chiang Ti Ts'ai-cheng," *loc. cit.* Chao Lieh reports (*loc. cit.*): "The first three-year plan began in 1937 . . ." Ch'en Chi-jung says ("Hsin Hsin-chiang Ti Ts'ai-cheng," *loc. cit.*): "After the middle of 1936 the whole province gradually became united . . . and it was possible to institute the three-year plan of reconstruction." Ch'en Chi-jung claims that in addition to the Sinkiang Commercial Bank, the Central Bank of China established a Tihwa office in 1938 to facilitate financial transactions between Sinkiang and the interior, and that the Farmers Bank of China has also opened an office there. *Loc. cit.*

3: Skrine G-3 (1922-1924) 1926 All Sinkiang All

CHAPTER IV

THE MOUNTAIN ROAD TO CATHAY

THE name Tashqurghan means in Turki "stone fort", and the place is probably identical with the λίθινος πύργος of which Ptolemy speaks as having been the extreme western emporium of Serikē (China). At that time it was called by the Chinese Hopanto and was the capital of the frontier district of that name.[1] Now once more it is the headquarters of the Chinese Amban of Pu-li or Sariqol, who rules a long strip of country along the eastern rim of the Pamir plateau. Sariqol was made into an administrative district at the beginning of the present century, when it came into prominence from the Chinese point of view owing to the occupation of the neighbouring Pamirs by Russia. For years, indeed, the Tsar's Government kept a detachment of infantry at Tashqurghan, regardless of the fact that it was Chinese territory; the solid mud-brick fort built by them is still in good repair though it has been empty since its evacuation in 1920 by the last remnants of the former Cossack garrison of the Pamirs. Ethnically, the district is interesting as being populated in about equal proportions by two contrasting races. These are, firstly, the Tajiks, who are remarkably pure specimens of the original *Homo alpinus* stock and have inhabitated this remote corner of High Asia since the dawn of history; secondly, the Kirghiz. These latter belong to the tribe called by the Russians Kara-Kazak; they are the southernmost branch of the great Kirghiz race, and they can only live as far south as the Pamirs, the immense elevation of which makes up for the low latitude and produces a climate as rigorous as that of the Steppes.

Two entirely different routes, each about ten marches in length, connect Tashqurghan with Kashgar. The one usually followed in summer is the eastern or Chichiklik route which,

[1] Stein, "Sand-buried Ruins of Khotan," pp. 71–3.

3: Skrine G-3 (1922-1924) 1926 All Sinkiang All

after crossing four passes between 12,000 and 16,000 feet high and traversing three different valleys sparsely inhabited by Kirghiz, debouches upon the great plain of Central Asia near the flourishing town of Yangi Hissar. The winter route goes north from Tashqurghan over the easy Ulugh Rabat Pass (circ. 13,500 feet) to the Rangkul Pamir, past the beautiful lakes of Little Qarakul and Basikul, and then down through the tremendous gorge of the Gez River which cuts through the Kashgar Range between the great ice-clad massifs of Qungur (25,146 feet) and Chakragil (22,180 feet). It comes out on to the Kashgarian plain at Tashmalik, whence the city is reached in two marches.

Sariqol is about the most unpopular district among Chinese officials in all Eastern Turkistan. Its capital is 10,250 feet above the sea and has a climate which may be described as three months spring and nine months winter; most of the ten days' journey from the nearest civilization has to be performed on horseback instead of in the Peking cart beloved of the travelling Celestial; last but not least, the inhabitants are an unruly lot, very different from the timid and peaceable Turkis of the plains. Small wonder then that the Governor of Chinese Turkistan at Urumchi has the utmost difficulty in finding men for the post. But he does find them, and what is more he removes and replaces them if (as may be expected sometimes in a place so remote from supervision) they misbehave themselves; a fact which throws a remarkable light upon the effectiveness of Governor Yang's control over a district which is no less than two months' journey from his headquarters.

But though the Ambans may regard themselves as Ugolinos condemned to an Inferno of cold, the summer visitor to Tashqurghan will find much that is pleasing in the marvellous clearness and purity of its air, its spacious greensward threaded with pellucid streams and the beautiful shapes of the mountains which stand in glittering ranks all round, yet not too near it. Conspicuous among these is Muz Tagh Ata, "Father of the Ice Mountains," blazing in all its mighty mass of whiteness over the vivid green of the meadows. Though it is 24,388 feet high, the enormous width of Muz Tagh Ata detracts from its beauty as a mountain, and it does not compare for a moment with Rakaposhi or Nanga Parbat; but its very size is impressive, and the vast extent of its snowfields and glaciers, the whiteness of which has an intense

3: Skrine G-3 (1922-1924) 1926 All Sinkiang All

636 brigands who infest Kansu, Szechwan and other western provinces are unknown in Sinkiang, which a European may traverse unescorted and unmolested from end to end. Conditions, indeed, vary in the different districts according to the energy and efficiency of the Magistrate of the time. Like crows round a corpse, thieves flock to a district to which an opium-smoker has been appointed, while they desert that of an energetic "Amban" as rats a sinking ship; but in general it may be said that life is safe everywhere and property as secure as in most European countries. Moreover, to Governor Yang and his subordinates must be given credit for what is probably a higher degree of prosperity and contentment than the country has known, at any rate since ancient times. They do not make the mistake of crippling agriculture by oppression and otherwise killing the goose that lays the golden eggs. They come of a race which has two thousand years of administrative experience behind it, and knows well how to base its power upon the strong rock of agricultural prosperity. Oppression exists, but it is chiefly by Turki minor officials, and the District Magistrate is usually there to appeal to in case of need. The predecessors of these same "Begs" were far more rapacious in the days of Yakub Beg, who was of the same class and type as themselves. Then, there was no appeal. Instances of serious and prolonged oppression by Chinese officials under the present régime are rare. A notable case in our time was that of General Ma Titai, the history of whose crimes and of the doom which avenged them will be found in a later chapter. With the exception of land revenue, the taxation is almost entirely indirect; the incidence of the former is light, even taking into consideration the varying proportions over-collected by the Ambans for their own pockets; while the taxes on internal trade are farmed by Turki contractors who, like the Begs, dare not go too far in the mulcting of their own fellow-countrymen. At any rate, the fact remains that the population is steadily increasing and every year more and more land is being taken into cultivation. We saw the process going on in several of the districts we visited, notably in Maralbashi, Posgam and Karakash.[1] District

[1] Already the Merket subdivision of the Maralbashi district, two marches down-river from Yarkand, is too big to be administered effectively from Maralbashi, and there is talk of its being erected into a separate third-class district, just as was done a few years ago with Posgam when it was separated from Karghalik, a new bazaar built and a third-class magistrate installed.

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Magistrates who succeed in bringing a certain area of new land into cultivation—35,000 *mu* or about 6,000 acres, I believe—receive a good mark at headquarters and are singled out for promotion. This results occasionally in money being wasted on canals along which the water will not run—"Amban's Follies" we used to call them—but it meant that ambitious Magistrates encourage the spread of cultivation in every way and see that new settlers are left alone by the tax-gatherer. For three years a settler on new ground pays no revenue, and half-rates for the next three.

It is true that moral and intellectual progress does not exist in Kashgaria. There are no schools except those attached to mosques, at which nothing is taught by the mullas but reading, writing and the Qur'an. By means of a strict censorship not only are books and all written or printed matter dealing with current events kept from the hands of Chinese and Muhammadans alike, but the dissemination in writing of news or of any ideas whatever among the inhabitants is effectually prevented. All this, no doubt, is highly reprehensible from the point of view of the democratic idealist. But after all, if the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the *summum bonum* for any community, as some people are still old-fashioned enough to believe, there is a good deal to be said for it. At any rate, in this twentieth-century world of hustle and the Yellow Press, of merciless competition and all-pervading publicity, one may be forgiven for hoping—selfishly, perhaps—that a corner of the earth may long be spared in which a peaceful, contented, simple, lovable and by no means uncivilized population exists without motor-cars or cinemas, without newspapers or telephones, without broadcasting or advertisements, without a mile of railway or even of metalled road, a land steeped in the Middle Ages, picturesque and quaint almost beyond belief—truly an Arcady of Cathay.

Of our life and work at Kashgar the part that D. and I liked best was the touring, of which we had plenty. Though the trade between India and Chinese Turkistan is strictly limited by the great length and difficulty of the Leh route, the number of Indians connected with it who are permanently or temporarily resident in the oases of the Tarim Basin is surprising. At Yarkand alone there are usually between 100 and 150 Hindu traders, most of them representing firms in one or other of two Punjab towns, Amritsar and Hoshiarpur. Sindhi money-lenders from Shikarpur ply their trade at Yangi

3: Skrine G-3 (1922-1924) 1926 All Sinkiang All

use in the same way as the Persian traveller uses his fastest mule; on this animal, called the *abdari* mule, he puts his bedding, his prayer-carpet, his samovar and cups, his water-jug, some food and his personal servant. This is a good plan, for it minimizes the discomfort of arriving at a cheerless *manzil* (stage) long before one's caravan.

No less than four different farewell tea-drinkings at various points along the road leading out of Yarkand delayed our final departure till nearly midday. Two hours' trot-and-canter through a perfectly flat country of wide fields, heavy timber, canals and prosperous-looking farms brought us to the house of a wealthy British subject of Chitral extraction who had a complicated dispute concerning rights of way and water with his next-door neighbour, a Kashmiri colonist. After toying for a while with various dishes and sipping tea, D. went in to see the ladies of the house and I sallied forth with the parties and went over the points in dispute with them on the spot. When I thought that the incessant cross-fire of argument and vociferation from both sides (so like the Indian and so unlike the easy-going Turki) had continued long enough I cut it short by firmly framing issues and referring them to a more or less unwilling committee of greybeards with strict injunctions to submit their decisions on my return from Keriya. No one will be more surprised than myself if well-thought-out replies on all issues are handed in to me by the arbitrators in due course; my hope merely is that the greybeards in question will succeed in bringing about a reconciliation between the parties and thus free themselves from the responsibility of deciding on my issues.

A few miles further on we came to the Yarkand or (as it is called lower down) Tarim River, an interesting stream. Its upper reaches drain some of the most difficult country in the world, the untrodden solitudes of Oprang and the terrible Raskam gorges on the north side of the main Karakoram range; then for a thousand miles it forces its way through the dread Takla Makan Desert, only to lose itself at last in the lakes and marshes of Lop Nor, last remnant of what was once a great Central Asian Sea. In November the various channels can be forded easily on horseback; but the volume both of water and of traffic in summer is shown by the number of large, clumsy ferry-boats one sees pulled up on the beach on both sides of the two main channels.

Posgam is a new district which has been carved out of the unwieldy Karghalik charge and placed under a Magistrate of the third class. A Yamen and fine new bazaars are being built of timber by the Chinese to the east of the village. This is only one of several new districts, the formation of which has been necessitated by the increase of population and the spread of cultivation during the last thirty years.

Karghalik, 13th November, 1922.

We had a remarkable experience yesterday when two squadrons of cavalry turned out in force to escort us into this town. One of them with its band and numerous banners marched in front of us, and the other with its band and even more banners brought up the rear. The bands both played at the same time, but their repertoire being limited they filled in the gaps by playing scales on their trumpets against one another. Just as the rear band was starting with its

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there is the much-frequented shrine of one of Kashgar's many lady-saints, Bu Mariam. It is a simple affair; a grove of ancient desert-poplars, two or three single-storied buildings on a little hill, a tall conical mound of faggots and sand surmounted by a bundle of long poles, and all round in serried ranks the tombs of the Faithful. Escaping with difficulty from the idly curious of Tarim Bazar we made tea for ourselves under a scented tamarisk-bush near the shrine. In a corner under the ancient poplars some families of pilgrims from Khotan were encamped with their ponies, donkeys and goats around them like a nomad tribe on the move; an incredibly old beggar in his elaborately-ragged, almost theatrical patchwork costume and mediæval sheepskin-rimmed extinguisher hat doddered about among the graves; and all the while, incongruously, every tree and every bush was loud with the chorus of Spring.

Next day we crossed the westernmost and narrowest section of the Takla Makan, 24 miles broad, to the tiny settlement of Langar among the first jungles of the Yarkand River. It was not a pleasant march. Though there were no high dunes to cross, the going was heavy throughout, the sun's heat trying and the endless vistas of tamarisk-cones inexpressibly monotonous. The tarantass had as usual been sent back after our first double march, and we both rode. But the worst was now over. Next morning an exhilarating two-mile canter brought us to the river, across the placid waters of which roomy flat-bottomed ferry-boats were plying to and fro with cargoes of fur-hatted carters, blue-hooded Chinese carts, gaily-decked horses tinkling with bells and villagers in costumes of many colours. Across the river, in a grove of trees from which last year's leaves had not yet fallen (so calm and windless is the winter here), we were met by an unexpectedly imposing cortège. Twenty horsemen escorted a landau drawn by three fine bays, harnessed troika-fashion and skilfully handled by an obviously Russian-trained Turki coachman. In the carriage sat a good-looking, clean-shaven young Chinese gentleman dressed in the regulation black silk coat and white skirt, and wearing the neat black cap of his country instead of the ridiculous bowler favoured by most of his colleagues. It was the Amban of Maralbashi, of which district Merket is a subdivision, and he was actually on tour—the first and last occasion during the whole of our time in Kashgaria on which we met a District Magistrate away from

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his headquarters. Still more surprising, he greeted us in halting but recognizable English, a language which he told us he had learnt as a student at Peking but had since had little opportunity to practise. His Russian, we understood, was much more fluent, as he had been attached for a year to the Chinese Consulate at Irkutsk before the Revolution. Mr. Chiu was one of the few specimens I came across of official Young China in the exile of the Far West; others included Mr. M. Y. Tao, Foreign Affairs Secretary to the Tao Tai, and three different Postmasters of Kashgar. I had had no previous experience of the ex-student class, and I must say I was most favourably impressed with their manners, intelligence and capacity.

Merket, though the centre of a large and growing oasis, is merely a big market-village nestling under the lee of a low range of sand-hills crowned with mud-built shrines and tombs. The people belong to a race of unknown origin called the Dulanis, who interested me very much. Sir P. Sykes says they are akin to the Kirghiz of the mountains[1]; but in my humble opinion they have no connexion with that race, and are probably indigenous to the marshes and jungles of the Yarkand (Tarim) River between Yarkand and Aksu. They differ from the Kirghiz in facial appearance, physique, mentality and habits even more widely than from their neighbours the Turkis, with whom at any rate they have intermarried to a certain extent. The only common characteristic I noticed in the Kirghiz and the Dulanis was the freedom accorded by both to their women, who not only mix freely unveiled with the men but do most of the hard work for them; and this is probably only a superficial resemblance, for the status of women among the Kirghiz is directly connected with their nomadic life. The Dulani women are remarkably good-looking and vivacious in the Southern European style and, as Miss Sykes noticed, eat, dance and sing with the men at entertainments which often last the whole night long—gaieties quite foreign to the quiet, Northern, rather staid Kirghiz. A vivid impression was made on us both by a handsome young village woman we talked to one afternoon, who might have been own sister to the subject of one of Miss Sykes' most charming photographic studies. As we sat on a bank near the western edge of the oasis looking out towards the golden dunes of the Takla Makan, she passed us carrying a sick lamb in her arms to the little farm buried in trees that

[1] "Through Deserts and Oases of Central Asia," p. 241.

3: Skrine G-3 (1922-1924) 1926 All Sinkiang All

CHAPTER XI

THE PEOPLE OF THE HAPPY VALLEY

THE Kirghiz of a valley like Kaying are genuine nomads, for they live almost entirely on their flocks and herds and move their tents from place to place according to the season and the state of the grazing, just as do the Turki and Baluch tribes of Persia and Baluchistan. But whereas the latter cover large areas and have sometimes a hundred miles or more to travel from their summer to their winter grazings, the whole range of the Kaying Kirghiz is but ten miles from end to end. Their *yailāqs* or summer grazing-grounds are at the feet of the glaciers 11,500 to 12,000 feet above the sea; in April and May, and again in October and November, their tents are pitched where we first found them, at 9,000–9,500 feet, in the broadest part of the valley; their *qishlāq* or winter camping-place is at Bash Kupruk on the banks of the Qaratash just below its junction with the Kaying stream, 7,000 feet above the sea. The inhabitants of the adjoining Çhopkana and Qaratumush Jilghas have even shorter distances between their summer and winter camping-grounds, seven and five miles respectively. Though no Chinese official ever penetrated these barely-accessible glens, they are effectively under the jurisdiction of the Amban of Yangi Hissar, who exacts revenue through the Beg of the Qaratash Circle, our friend Sabit. The Beg is responsible to the District Magistrate for the collection of revenue and the maintenance of law and order; he in his turn relies on the *unbashis* or headmen (literally, heads of ten) of the different glens, himself visiting his circle only once or twice a year.[1]

[1] The four divisions of the Qaratash Circle, together with the (nominal) number of households in each for revenue purposes, are as follows:

Qaratash, i.e. the main valley above the junction of the Chimghan with the main stream, 60 households.

S N 311 The newest development, found in the Northwest, especially in Sinkiang, is the partial industrialization of those areas which are the sources of coal, oil, gold, iron, alum, quartz, gypsum, nitrates, salt, and, as recently reported, uranium.

S N 563 The non-Chinese peoples of the Northwest are not only outnumbered b ut also outweighed in economic and political respects. For more than two thousand years, the Chinese have been ruling those areas (with short interruptions as far as Sinkiang and Chinghai are concerned), even though they never had more than a few garrisons stationed in frontier areas. Those garrisons made it possible for a thin stratum of Chinese officials to rule the areas on the top level. On the lower level, the indigenous peoples and tribes governed themselves - under the supervision of the Chinese viceroys or governors and their bureaucracy.

S N 175 642 199 631 The general policy of the Chinese government in Peking was to make use of the existing form of governmental institutions of frontier areas like Sinkiang, Chinghai, and Inner-Mongolia. In Sinkiang (prior to 1884 it was called "Hui-chiang," i.e., Muslimic Dominion), two types of local government had existed: the Muslimic type and the Mongolian type. The S [171] Northern and Northeastern part of Sinkiang, where the Mongols were the dominant inhabitants, had the same governmental institutions as Outer and Inner-Mongolia, namely, banners ruled by dzasaks, who were appointees of the Emperor in S N [668] [565] Peking. The Republic of China tacitly recognized their ranks and interfered very little with their functions. Only Communist China deprived the nomad aristocracy of their titles and rights.

175 631 795 649 659 The Muslimic communities were fuled by Bäks with various ranks: the Ak'im Bäk, "local governor"; the Ishkhan Bäk, "assistant governor"; the Shang Bäk, "collector of revenue"; the Qazi, "judge"; the Kukbashi or Mirabu Bäk, "superintendant of agriculture"; Yüzbashi, "hundred-men-leader"; Onbashi, "ten-men-leader"; etc. All the local Bäks were appointed by the emperor or later on by the president of the Republic upon the recommendation of the Imperial or Republican governor, although it must be stated that some governors of Sinkiang, Chin Shu-jen and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, ruled and governed the S N province without asking Peking for the consent of appointments.

175 631 649 [202] Besides the Chinese civil service there existed Chinese military staffs and detachments, centered in Ili, Urumchi, Kulja, Chuguchak, Kashghar, Sining, Su-chou, Lan-chou, etc. Relay stations provided communication between the government in Peking and the frontier areas. Maintaining the effectiveness of the means of communications was an important duty of 000 Chinese officials. Only since 1930 have some automobile highways been built, and the Communist regime, in cooperation

S N 489 496 648 668 175 [491] Only since 1930 have some automobile highways been built, and the Communist regime, in cooperation with Soviet Russia, are building the first Inner Asiatic railway, linking Alma-Ata with Lan-chou. This railway will, without doubt, speed up the Sinification of the frontier areas, and above all add industrialization to agriculture and pastoral nomadism.

S N 631 563 657 175 As far as Chinhai was concerned, the Western Mongols (the Oirats) were also locally ruled by dzasaks, the leaders of banners. Unlike the banners of Inner and Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang, however, they did not combine banners to form leagues or to elect one of their tribal leaders as the captain-general of the league. The Chinese governor- with his seat in Sining - functioned as captain-general. In regard to the nomadic Tibetans, the Chinese government appointed chieftains as dzasak-lamas and gave them the rights and the privileges which this office involves. The sedentary Tibetans were ruled by t'u-ssus, also appointees of the Peking government. By and large, this governmental pattern existed until the Communists came into power.

S N 563 659 175 The form of governing non-Chinese peoples changed in the course of time in various ways, but one thing never changed: the aim of the Peking government to rule, to suppress, to exploit, and to sinify them.

S 631 635 175 Unlike the eighteen provinces in China proper, the province of Sinkiang (after 1884) and the Eastern Three Provinces, (after 1907) the areas comprising Mongolia, Tibet, and Chinese Turkestan, although occupying more space than China proper, were administrated by a quite different type of governmental system.

S 631 657 175 647 Political subdivisions of the Chinese Empire such as Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan and Tibet were usually referred to as dependencies. This is however an inaccurate translation of the Chinese term "fan," which really means "the barbarian west." Since the cultural, ethnic and historical background in these areas was very different from the rest of the Empire, these regions required, and in practice had, a very particular type of governmental control. All these frontier territories were administered by the "Department of Dependencies" in Peking. This department was subdivided into the following bureaus:

a. Inner Mongolian bureau, that administered frontier boundaries, titles of nobility, appointment of officials, military affairs, league conferences, and finally organization of banner units of Inner Mongolia.

b. "Reception bureau" for Inner Mongolia nobility, that was responsible for the payments and allowances to the Inner Mongolian aristocracy.

c. Eastern Turkestan bureau, that was in charge of Moslem affairs in Eastern Turkestan.

S
631 d. Justice bureau which took care of the civil and criminal
657 cases of the frontier area.
175 e. Territorial development bureau which took care of the
647 preservation of forests, wild animals and which was in charge of the improvement of live-stock, fur curing and of the Mongolian
S N inhabitants in general.
175 The Yüan and Manchu dynasties, which themselves repre-
657 sented minorities, employed a quite different, one might say a
563 positive attitude towards non-Chinese. Generally speaking, the Manchus functioned and acted as the mediators between
S N minorities and the Chinese. But even the Manchus, after they
175 had become completely sinified, used colonial methods that
657 led to revolts and uprisings in Sinkiang, in Kansu and in Chinghai.
563 The Chinese Muslims in Kansu, e.g., revolted in 1648, 1781-1784,
669 1820-28, 1862-78, 1895-97, 1918-21, 1928-1929, at which times they tried, with little success, to get rid of the Chinese mastery and to establish their own Muslimic realm. Whenever such uprisings occurred, the Muslimic Turks of Sinkiang sympathized with them or revolted at the same time. In Sinkiang, Yakub Bëk even succeeded in establishing a short-lived Muslimic empire between 1864-1877. The Western Mongols of Sinkiang, Kansu and Chinhai, who revolted and established the Dzungarian Empire between 1673 and 1697, were defeated by a Chinese army in 1697 and again in 1757. In Chinghai, the Tanguts (Tibetans) revolted successfully many times, but like all other minorities who tried and failed, they were eventually brought under Chinese control again. Needless to say, all these unsuccessful petty revolutions, revolts and uprisings of non-Chinese or Chinese Muslims, always upset the economy of the area greatly, increasing thereby the hatred towards the Chinese in general, and the Chinese officials in particular.

S N II. Main Patterns of Social Life, Social Organization and Mode
175 of Economy of the Minorities.
631
619 Even though the Northwest is occupied by a fantastic conglomeration of heterogeneous societies, it still can be, and always has been, considered by politicians as one area, a
S N political, military, and economic unit, and also as the "land
175 of promise," which it in fact became. When the Communists
631 again set up the unit as an administrative area in 1949, it
668 was only the continuation of an old concept, held by the
178 Chinese rulers because of the geographical location of the North-
619 west and its commercial traditions (silk road, Mongolia-
648 Tibet road, Chinghai-Tibet road, Sinkiang-India road, Sinkiang-Russia road), which culminated in Sheng Shih-ts'ai's cooperation with Russia, or earlier with Yakub Bëk's policy

S N 175 631 668 178 619 648 towards Russia, Turkey, and England. The cultural cohesion created by Islam that connects Chinese Turkestan with Russian Turkestan and other neighboring Muslim countries, and that created by Buddhism that connects Mongolia with Tibet through Chinghai and small areas of Sinkiang, marked the four provinces of Sinkiang, Chinhai, Kansu, and to a small degree, Shensi, as one single area which represents one administrative unit.

S 563 241 The Eastern Turks:

The main pattern of social life of the Eastern Turks is based primarily on "Oasis Agriculture" with its irrigational complex. All agriculture in this area is made possible through the organized use of water. The family organization among the Eastern Turks is therefore an extended one, since a certain level of productivity can only be reached through collective labor (upkeep of irrigational systems and dikes). One reason the Eastern Turks developed the extended family pattern is that the family recieves water in proportion to the amount of labor its members put into the upkeep of irrigational systems and canals; the greater the family, the more water is therefore provided for their land.

S 563 596 [312] [241]

The Internal structure of the family system is not based upon clan rules. Eastern Turkic communities are governed by a body of leaders, selected from the community itself whereas the larger governmental districts are headed by Chinese officials or, at present, by Chinese Communists. A secondary aspect of Eastern Turkic social life is formed by trade and handicrafts. Merchants and craftsmen form "guilds" which in turn influence the social life of the community.

S [622] [634] S 563 S [441]

S K 563 614 F K 563 233 361 [177] [668] S K [622] S N 563 [233] [594] Kirghiz and Kazakhs:

Kirghiz and Kazakh society is clan-based. (The definition of the notion of "clan" is explained in the chapter about the Social Structure.) All family relationships are deeply rooted in the clan system. The main pattern of social life among these two tribes is created by their nomadic way of life, whose most essential economic activity is cattle breeding. The transition to a semi-sedentary life is now under way. The Communists insist that the Kirghiz and Kazakhs occupy a permanent winter camp site, since this facilitates better political control over the tribes. The choice of the summer camp site still remains more or less in the hands of the tribes. Kirghiz and Kazakhs are ruled by "biks," or "manaps" (elders) responsible to the Chinese officials.

The Mongols: general remarks.

Mongol social life is based on nomadic pastoralism. The basic unit is the nuclear family. A group of patrilineally

2k

175 the revolution reached Sinkiang and the revolutionists occupied Urumchi, it was Yüan who defeated them. The revolutionists, led by a man from Hunan, one of the many who had migrated to Sinkiang, withdrew to northern Sinkiang where they proclaimed the independence of Ili. One of Yüan's officers, Yang Tseng-hsin, recruited a Moslem corps, marched north and succeeded in suppressing the revolt. With the military power in his hands and with the backing of Yüan Ta-hua, Yang assumed the governorship of Sinkiang. The Republican government formally confirmed the office in 1912.

175 159 635 669 1. Governor Yang Tseng-hsin

The first phase of Yang's administration was military. Oppression of the local officials and crushing taxes drove the Chinese Moslems in Qomul (Hami) to revolt, but Yang soon quashed the insurrection. In Ili, Chinese and Manchurian revolutionists continued their resistance. Yang dulled the edge of their power by negotiations. He recognized their republic as a part of Sinkiang and their officials as legitimate officials. Later, when the Ili revolutionists agreed to accept a loan from Russia without the knowledge of the provincial or central authorities, Yang wired Peking and received orders to seize and execute the leaders. Yang acted promptly in taking over control of that region.

159 175 635 575 668 Another source of trouble for Yang Tseng-hsin was the activities of a secret society known as Ko-lao Hui, introduced into Sinkiang by the troops of Tso Tsung-t'ang and Liu Chin-t'ang. In later years it gained many adherents among the Chinese Moslems. A member who later rose to prominence was Ma Hung-pin, who under the Communists became a vice chairman of Kansu province. During the disorders following the fall of the dynasty, the headquarters of the secret society moved to Kashgar and its influence spread to Kharashar, Kucha, Aksu, Yarkand and Khotan. It took Yang Tseng-hsin two years to suppress the organization.

159 635 175 648 On the northern borders of Sinkiang, Yang's troops fought a number of skirmishes with the Outer Mongolian forces who invaded Sinkiang in 1912 and seized control of Kobdo. Hostilities finally ended with the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Yang and the government at Urga.

159 635 175 185 631 Internally, Yang undertook administrative and financial reforms. By severe punishment of corrupt officials he sought to check graft, and by the issuance of a new currency he tried to halt inflation. Under him, a million mou (about 135,000 acres) of new land was opened to cultivation. To win the support of the natives, he gave power at the lower administrative level to the begs - Uighur headmen.' Since their tenure of office was thirty years to life, they had an advantage over Chinese-appointed magistrates who were periodically changed. In official proclamations, he permitted the use of the native languages. This policy was effective until the collapse of the Imperial Russian government.

642 668 177 it was announced that altogether 1,000 officials from the same offices (the majority of them Party and Youth Corps members of whom one tenth are higher officials), will be transferred to Sinkiang to serve in the Regional County and Ch'ü offices and in the Economic Projects. (People's Daily, August 21, 1955).

The politico-economical development of Sinkiang follows the same pattern as that of the interior of China. All the detailed facts of using Chinese in party meetings, introducing a new currency in place of Sinkiang currency, etc., show that Autonomous Sinkiang is an integral part of China. The sufferers in the whole process are the aboriginal inhabitants of Sinkiang for they are expected to make the greatest sacrifices, greater even than those of the population of the rest of China, for the economic and military strengthening of the Communist world.

668 631 177 162 At the beginning of the new regime in 1949, Sinkiang was called (as it had been under the Nationalist Government) a province - divided into ten special districts and these were subdivided into seventy-nine counties. In 1954, Five Autonomous "Chou" were established. Four of them were established in July, 1954. They contain three counties each, while the former special Districts contained, on an average, ten counties each. The population of three of these Autonomous "Chou" is 57,000 , 98,000 and 135,000. Three of the Autonomous "Chou" were Mongolian and the other two were Moslem. In November, 1954, the largest Autonomous "Chou" was established in the Ili Valley, called the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Area with a population of 70,000 (P.D. December 6, 1954, or NCNA December 2, 1954).

On September 20, 1955, it was stated that the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region was to replace "Sinkiang Province." It was also announced that the establishment of the smaller Autonomous "Chou" within Sinkiang had now been concluded with the establishment of five Autonomous Chou and six Autonomous Counties (Kuang-ming jih-pao, September 14, 1955).

In fact, however, the population in these Autonomous Chou and Autonomous Counties does not exceed 500,000, which is less than one tenth of the total population of Sinkiang which is officially set at 4,780,000 people. (Kuang-ming jih-pao, September 15, 1955). Thus the extension of autonomous rule is limited - a sign that the erection of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Area itself has only a token significance in spite of the fact that the Uighurs number 3.6 million constituting seventy to eighty percent of the total population of the province.

631 131 668 177 The Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region is not an easily accessible area. In the past, its geographical isolation has been aggravated by the seclusion policy of the Communist regime for

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631 political and military reasons. After the last British Consulate
131 of Kashgar was closed, the curtain has become even more
668 impenetrable there than in any other part of China. Not even
179 Chinese are allowed to travel into Sinkiang without special
[648] permits.

N F. Northwest As An Outlet for Chinese Overpopulation
167 The Northwest Region has been long regarded by the Chinese
185 as one of the major outlet areas for China's overpopulation. Once the plans to conserve water and soil are completed - especially along the Yellow River in Shensi and Kansu - arable land will be considerably extended. But water and soil conservancy will involve a lot of problems before the land is actually made productive - not to mention that its sustaining capacity is limited. Therefore the Northwest as an outlet for China's overpopulation is tentative and should only be regarded as a partial and temporary solution.

N 1. Extension of Arable Land by Irrigation and Soil Conservancy
311 According to plan the irrigated area in the mid-Yellow River
185 Basin will grow from 12,717,000 acres at present to some 19,105,000 acres. Agricultural output in the irrigated area will more than double. Annual grain output will increase by 6,741,000 long tons and cotton by 590,000 long gons. The loess regions with their barren mountains and desolate gullies covering 143,000 square miles, will become a land of plenty. Most of the land for irrigation development under the project will be in the provinces of Shensi and Kansu. ("China's Sorrow" Will Be No More - The Taming and Exploiting of the Yellow River, by Li Jui, People's China, August 6, 1955, p. 9-15).

S The area of arable land in Sinkiang has also been extended,
311 but it is not easy to ascertain by how much or by what means.
185 In 1953 it had reached twenty million mou, 4,100,000 more than in 1949 (PD. August 28, 1955); in 1954 more than 5,000,000 mou above 1949, i.e. a total of 21 million mou (KM. September 15, 1955; by 1955 22 million mou (PD. October 31, 1955).

According to the above figures, the increase between 1949 and 1955 would be six million mou. But there appear some discrepancies with other information. The difficulty is that the 1950 data for the extension of arable land in Sinkiang was not 16 million but 18.195 million mou (Newspaper Reading Handbook, Hankow, p. 25, 1950). Thus if the present data are reliable, the 1949-55 increase would be three million mou instead of six million, of which 1,100,000 mou are due to the labor of the Army Agrarian Production Troops.

S According to official reports, in 1953, 1.6 million tons of
433 food stuffs were produced in Sinkiang (PD. August 28, 1955). About the production in 1954, it is known that there was an

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563 body skin is brownish or yellowish and brachycephalism is found
141 in more than 92%. They have high cheek bones, the nose is flat
142 and the eyes show the typical Mongoloid eyefold. The eyes are either black or brown, sometimes even light brown. The hair is also black or dark brown, coarse and straight. Hair growth is sparse. The average height is about 1670 mm. The trunk is strongly built and the legs are rather short in comparison to those
S of the Uzbeks or Tajiks.
563 3. Relations with non-Mongols

There is no animosity between the various Mongol tribes, but there is a definite antagonism between the Mongols and the Kazakhs and between the Mongols and the Chinese.

S 4. History
563 The Western Mongols are direct descendants from the Oirats
175 of the great Mongolian conquest. At least, since 600 A.D. they
S have lived in this area. Some of the Torguts are recent immi-
[167] grants or, more accurately, returnees. They left Russia in 1771 and returned to their homeland, Dzungaria.

S As far as social organization is concerned, the Oirats are
563 said to represent the old Mongolian pattern. Tribal leaders inherit their political positions, and property is considered in terms of pastures and cattle.

S 5. The leagues
563 The Mongols of Sinkiang were organized into three leagues:
631 (1) the Unen Susuqtu League, consisting of ten banners of Torguts
(2) the Batu Setkhiltu League, consisting of three banners of Khoshuts
(3) the Ching Setkhiltu League, consisting of three banners of Khoshuts and seven banners of Uriangkhai.

B. The Mongols of Kansu

N 1. The Mongours
*563 a. history
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M The Mongours are the most important Mongolian tribe living
[101] in Kansu. They are known under various names. Potanin called them Shirongols, the Chinese call them Tu-jen, the Olots and Torguts call them Dalda or Doldo, the Tanguts call them Cha-hor, but the Mongours themselves use only the latter term. The Mongours
N have been studied by Father Schram who states that the Mongours
*563 came to Kansu in the course of the Mongol conquests in the thir-
*175 teenth century and that furthermore the Mongours were already
[167] settled in the Hsi-ning area when the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644)
M was founded. The Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1911) "benefitting by the
175 experience of the Ming succeeded in organizing the country, pri-
[167] marily by subduing the neighbouring tribes of Kokonor, assigning definite territories to each of them and placing them under the jurisdiction of an Amban in 1732; having thus removed the danger of forays by nomadic tribes they were able to develop the country

B. The Western (Oirat) Mongols (See also IMAR, Social Structure)

563 175 After the decline of the Mongolian Empire in the 14th century, the Western Mongols (the tribes Choros, Khoit, Khoshut and Torgut) of Dzungaria established the so-called Oirat Federation. [671] Its social structure is best summarized in the Oirat codex Chaghajachi yin bichik "Book of the Judges", based on the Jassa of Chingis Khan.

563 596 [595] [671] [851] Life within the extended family is absolutely patriarchal. Although polygyny is not mentioned in the codex it is an accepted part of the society. The children of concubines are legitimate. The order of precedence among the children depends on the social status of their mothers.

563 428 After the father's death, the eldest son inherits everything, including the father's wives and concubines with the exception of his own mother. Inheritance as well as descent follows the male line.

563 614 583 Among the Western Mongols clan exogamy is strictly observed, especially among the Torguts and Khoshuts of Sinkiang. Marriage entails the payment of a bride-price of at least two horses, two cows and twelve sheep. The bride-price for an aristocratic girl is considerably higher and consists of several dozen camels, horses and sheep. If a wife is divorced she is not permitted to take with her anything which has been given to her by her husband.

563 631 According to the Chaghajachi-yin bichik the Oirats were organized into ail, khoshun (banners) and aimak. In Sinkiang there are two khoshun of Torguts, one khoshun of Khoshuts and seven khoshun of Uriangkhai. The Khoshuts of the Alashan Area and the Torguts of the Edsin Gol Area each constitute one khoshun. Each khoshun lives on land and pastures with well-defined boundaries.

563 565 The same source details the various strata of Oirat society. It subdivides the entire Oirat population into three groups. The nobility (taiji) belong to the first group, the darkhans (soldiers, warriors, flag-bearers who are tax-exempt people) belong to the second group, and the kara kümüm (plebians) belong to the third group. Cutting across these other divisions is the highly respected group of monks (Llama, Ho-brog or pandit) who are also tax-exempt.

563 565 554 The Oirat princes are subdivided into six different ranks: a) Ch'in-Wang b) Chün-Wang c) Beile c) Beise d) Chen-kuo-kung and f) Hu-kuo-kung. The Oirat taijis have four ranks, e.g., the ruling leader of a khoshun who is called khoshun-u jasak is a taiji of the first rank. Besides these ranks honorary titles exist such as: erdeni "jewel", darkhan "master", tüsiyetü "pillar, support", daiching "hero", dalai "ocean" and batur "hero" etc. The Khoshun-u jasak is the ruler of his banner. Commoners [651] pay him tribute in the form of cattle or agricultural products.

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631 In administering the khoshun, the khoshun-u jasak appoints an aide who is called tusalakchi taiji. The administration of the military affairs of a khoshun rests in the hands of the jakirokchi and his aide who is called meiren-i janggin. After the death of the khoshun-u jasak his eldest son inherits the title and position. The aristo-
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[565] cracy and the clergy are highly respected by the kara kümün. The members of the Oirat aristocracy belong to very old Mongolian clans "otoks" which repeatedly had intermarried with Manchu or Tibetan aristocratic clans.

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[668]
[565] The Communist Government in Peking has abolished the rights and titles of the Mongol aristocracy of Sinkiang, Chinghai and Kansu.
[177]

C. The Nomadic Tibetans

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184 In terms of race, religion, language and origin, the nomadic and the sedentary Tibetans are fundamentally one people. Yet the great difference in subsistance economy has produced too many distinctive cultural traits to permit discussion of the Chinghai Tibetans as a whole. In recognition of this cleavage, the sedentary Tibetans will be discussed separately as part of the general sedentary population.

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[592] The basic unit of social organization is the encampment or "tent-circle" comprising a group of households from five to eighty or more, who band together for cooperation and protection. Within the encampment the households may represent related families but this is not necessarily the case. Frequently the encampment's population will have been augmented by sedentary Tibetans who have chosen life in the steppes. Moreover, changes in affiliation do occur, so that one or more tents from one group may secede
N
[622] and join another encampment. According to Ekvall ('939) most frequently the actual authority rests in the hands of the rgan-po (elders), who are men of substance and influence. There also is an individual titular head, formally selected, who acts as spokesman for the group.

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592 Membership in the individual black tent consists of the man, his wife and their offspring. If the sons are married, they and their wives sometimes are included as members of the tent. Occasionally also the husband of a daughter will live with his wife's people. However, a statistical survey by Yü Hsiang-wen revealed that 38 per cent of the tents housed a nuclear family. In addition to those linked by birth and marriage, the tent's members may include one or several servants or hanger-on who help in the work in return for the protection and hospitality of the tent. Perhaps
N
[562] it would be more accurate to say that the tent's inhabitants con-
[422] sist of the woman and her husband because the wife is the master of the tent and of its contents, just as she is the master of the products of the herds, although the husband owns the tent and the
000 herds. In those cases where a man has more than one wife, each

/The New Uighurs/

S 563 178 [31] individual and the community. Natural resources to not seem to be of prime importance in Sinkiang. However, their exploitation through free or forced labor will further break down Uighur kinship ties and thereby alter the social structure. In recent S [464] times large numbers of non-Uighur laborers have been introduced into the area, further augmenting alien cultural elements.

S 563 438 622 Uighurs participating in small-scale home industries and handicrafts are organized under the leadership of a Chong-usta. Unlike the merchant's "guild" aqsaqal, he is not a public official.

S 563 554 [631] [647] [692] Under the Manchu system the Bäks (communal leaders) were classed in five degrees of rank, ranging from the third to the seventh degree of the Chinese official scale. 1. Ak'im Bäk- local governor; 2. Ishkhan Bäk -Assistant Governor; 3. Shang Bäk - Collector of Revenue; 4. Katsanatch'i Bäk - same as above; 5. 'Hatze Bäk - Judge; 6. Mirabu Bäk - Superintendent of Agriculture.

S [312] As discussed previously, the Mirabu Bäk was also the official having authority over water rights and water distribution. In practice the Manchu Amban, highest Manchu official in a given area, chose the Ak'im Bäk who, in turn, chose his own subordinates.

S 563 241 554 Farm units were organized as follows: Ten such units were lead by an On-bashi, fifty by an Illik-bashi, one hundred by an Yüz-bashi.' The duties of the Bäks and Yüz-bashis mainly consisted of keeping and collecting registers and taxes. This governmental organization was abolished officially by the Chinese Revolution in 1911. However, traces of this structure are still found today.

S 563 668 177 The whole Uighur social structure certainly will undergo far-reaching changes under the Communist government. However, at this time only hypotheses about these changes can be advanced. As new cultural and political structures are imposed on the society, kinship ties will be further loosened. The Uighur communisty and its structure will take on new characteristics, as old institutions disappear and new ones are introduced. Except, perhaps, for the nuclear family, social groupings will be brought more and more into accordance with the new ideals of the society.

N B. The Sedentary Tibetans

*563 [592] [361] Much that has been said about the nomadic Tibetans holds equally true for their sedentary counterparts. Again the basic unit is the group of families living together. In the sedentary community, the village may be composed of from a dozen to seventy, eighty or even more houses arranged adjacent to

N [342] each other. The roofs of the normally two-storied buildings are close enough to form a pathway, and are used as such.

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S 829 668 177 fication of a non-Moslem is not likely to be a very spontaneous movement on the part of the Turkic people, nor is it conceivable that they "deeply love and warmly support the Central People's Government." To most of them it is a remote government in a foreign country - China - to which most of them have never been, and it is very difficult for them to visualize it as the government to whom they owe supreme allegiance.

S 631 554 668 177 829 Direct authority is represented by the local government bodies. Although composed of many Chinese officials, the representatives of the local population fill prominent positions in the local government also. There is a certain amount of pride felt by the local people owing to the fact that some of the important leaders are Turkic Moslems, who have achieved a position of importance in the government. It is quite likely that leaders like Burkhan and Saifuddin are quite popular among the Turks of Sinkiang. The Turkic refugees abroad and the strongly nationalistic-minded ones who still are in Sinkiang, look at these leaders participating in the Chinese Communist regime as traitors cooperating with the oppressive powers, rather than national heroes.

II. The Mongols of the Northwest

A. Introductory Remarks

N *563 [36] [162] Northwest China is the arena for some 150,000 Mongolian herdsmen. Although uniform in respect to their Buddhistic-nomadic culture and language (with the exception of the Monguors who speak a Mongolian-Tibetan mixed dialect) they do not constitute a political or areal unit, living as they do thousands of miles apart, in the northeastern area of Sinkiang, around the Tsaidam swamps area, in the Edzingol area, in the northern part of Kansu and even in some enclaves in Shensi. Since Chingis Khan, they have never constituted a political unit, although Legdan Khan united the major parts of them into a short-lived empire (see Historical Setting).

S 563 [361] [162]

The reason for this lack of unity is first and above all, the fact that the Mongols of the Northwest area are outnumbered by Chinese (30 million) and Turks (4 million). The second reason is the treatment by the Manchus who shifted the Mongol banners from place to place in connection with the Manchu, Sibo, and Solon banners, who constituted the main and more reliable garrisons in the frontier area. The reliability of the Mongolian garrisons was partly due to the policy toward the banner and tribal leaders who were made wang (king) or nobles of various ranks.

B. Views of the People with Respect to their own Country

N *563 829 The average Mongol of the Northwest is fully aware of the fact that he belongs to a minority and that all he possesses are his

S 563 829

/Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans/

S 563 642 643 179 829 The old administration of the Khan was not always liked by the Moslems, but he and his people were one, and they understood each other well. His Oriental style of court life was appreciated by the Turkis, and the Khan, by virtue of his hereditary title, was unquestionably accepted by them. There was immediate resentment among the populace at the suggested changes, and the resentment became the more bitter when a great display of highly organized officialdom was made.

S 563 179 631 642 829 [423] At the same time, the whole area of Hami was carefully surveyed and the land redistributed. Three large administrative districts were arranged and given names which dated back to the Han dynasty. The new government was to be wholly in Chinese hands, and the old Khanate system was to vanish. Chinese magistrates were appointed to hear the law cases and Chinese tax-collectors were to levy the dues and convey them to the capital, where they would be allocated to the respective departments. These propositions all seem legitimate to the Chinese authority and they were presented to the people as improved measures of justice; but the Moslems did not like them and had a great deal of suspicion towards them. There was also the rumor that some unappropriated land which the Turki farmers would have liked to use was given to the Chinese and that arrears of taxes from which the Chinese were exempt were demanded from Moslem landowners.

S [669] Suddenly that dangerous thing so well known to the Oriental as a "breath of fury" rose fiercely among men who had hitherto dealt only with their own Khan, and they unanimously determined on revolt.

N 829 565 [651] Fan Ch'ang-chiang, a well-known journalist connected with the most influential Chinese daily Ta Kung Pao in the prewar period and now editor of the People's Daily in Peking, reported, after a trip to the Northwest in 1936 through Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, and Ninghsia, that the common people, especially the peasants in Kansu, all had a very bad impression of the government. Because there were so many kinds of taxes, the people thought that the government had nothing to do but to collect taxes from the common people. The people did not trust the government. In regard to social customs Fan says that the Chinese in Kansu are very conservative in matters which have anything to do with their women. Even middle-aged women of respectable families can hardly have anny opportunity to be seen by or to be spoken to by any man who is not a relative or a neighbor. Young ladies must absolutely not be seen by strangers. Soldiers who have come from the coastal provinces and who are accustomed to more liberal relations between the two sexes were resented by the local people because they acted rather freely toward their women folk. Notwithstanding their bad impression of the government and their resentment toward the "outside" soldiers, the common Chinese in Kansu are

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THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

N 635 *668 179

I. The Historical Background

When the Communists conquered Northwest China, they created a Northwestern administrative area, which included the five provinces of Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Chinghai and Sinkiang. In 1954, the Communist Government abolished Ninghsia Province and put it under the jurisdiction of Kansu. In 1955 it changed Sinkiang Province into the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region. So now, Northwest China includes three provinces, namely, Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, and one autonomous region, Sinkiang.

S 635 628 179 S [642]

N 635 631 *175 S 635 631 175

Historically speaking, Shensi and Kansu were under one governor-general during the Manchu Dynasty. For many purposes, such as provincial examinations, the two provinces were handled as a unit. At that time, part of Chinghai and Ninghsia were considered to belong to Kansu. While most of Sinkiang was administered under a special military government system, its eastern strip, from Tihua (Urumchi) to Hami, was under the jurisdiction of the governor-general of Shen-Kan. When Sinkiang later was made a province, it absorbed all the territory west of Hami.

N 635 631 *175

Under the Nationalist Government, the Kokonor area was separated from Kansu. It became the nucleus of the Province of Chinghai, which was established in 1928. During the same year the Nationalist Government also established Ninghsia Province by uniting the northern counties of Kansu along the Yellow River with the two Mongolian Banners, Alashan and Edsin. Thus, when the Communist Government abolished Ninghsia as a province by combining it with Kansu, it merely reestablished part of the old border line.

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S 175 631 635 [642]

During most of the Manchu Dynasty, Sinkiang was a special area. The local people retained a high degree of self-government. Even after the area was established as a province, the Chinese government let the local leaders handle most of the business of their own people. Thus, the establishment of an autonomous region in Sinkiang also had a historical basis.

C 175 642 669 668

II. The Constitutional Systems

A. Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic

In October of 1927, Mao Tse-tung retreated to the border area of Hunan and Kiangsi. There he established the "Hunan-Kiangsi Border Region Worker-Peasant Government". This was the beginning of the Chinese Soviet Government. After the Communists had consolidated their position, they established a "Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic". This was a Communist constitution for a Communist government. After suffering severe losses from Nationalist attacks, the Chinese Communists were no longer able

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668 By this law, the key elections are those below the county level.
671 These elections were generally open elections by raising of hands
666 in public. Only under special conditions were secret ballots allowed.

Furthermore, in spite of article 4, which promised equal rights of election to different groups of people, article 5 disqualifies everyone who might vote in opposition.

The control of elections was tightened by article 8. As all campaign expenses are dispersed by the State Treasury, the Communists
C can easily make or break any candidate.
668 In the new Constitution of 1954, there are at least ten articles,
642 i.e., 23, 24, 27, 38, 39, 44, 56, 61, 86, referring to the right to
666 vote or right to stand for election. There is no basic change from the situation analyzed above.

N C. Political Rights in Practice
631 The following news items trace the practice of political rights
*668 in the Northwest: "On the basis of the universal convocation of People's Representatives' Conferences of all circles in municipalities and counties throughout the country, 20 provinces have successfully convened their first Provincial People's Representatives' Conference of all circles. These provinces and districts are...Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Chinghai...

N "Of these, the People's Representatives' Conferences of all
631 circles of the first 16 provinces in the above list have successfully
*668 elected their respective Provincial People's Government Committees. The People's Representatives' Conferences of various
666 provinces and administrative districts have further elected and set up consultative committees to assist the government in carrying out the resolutions of the conference after it adjourns." (NCNA, Peking, December 20, 1950).

N "Since last year, the provincial and municipal People's Gov-
631 ernments in the Northwest region have attached importance to
*668 People's Representative Conferences. Except for some pastoral districts of Chinghai, Ninghsia, and Sinkiang which still do not possess conditions for holding People's Representative Conferences, all counties and municipalities in the Northwest have held People's Representative Conferences while those of over 80 counties and municipalities exercise the functions and power of People's Congresses. But there are still a number of responsible officials of counties and municipalities who do not sufficiently understand that People's Representative Conferences and People's Congresses represent the basic system of our state and who do not convene People's Representative Conferences according to the system." (NCNA, Sian, July 15, 1952)

S "During the three years from 1949 to 1952, twice the Provin-
• 631 cial Conference of Representatives of All Nationalities and All
668 Groups of the People was held in Sinkiang Province. In each of

S
631 the 78 counties, 1 municipality, 1 central district in Sinkiang, at
668 least three times, and up to nine times...these conferences have been held. In Tihua Municipality and Ch'ien-tse County, the con-
S ference has already acted as the People's Congress. It elected
[666] the mayor or the head of the county and the Council members..." (Burhan: "The great achievements during the three years of people's Sinkiang" in Sinkiang Jih-pao, January 1, 1953).

S "In October, 1953, a general election was held..." (Burhan:
668 "The work report of the past six years of the Sinkiang Provincial
666 People's Government," a report at the 2nd meeting of the 1st session of the Provincial People's Congress, in Hsin-hua yüeh-pao, 1955, No. 11, p. 30).

N This general election mentioned by the Governor of Sinkiang,
668 Burhan, was one part of the election held all over the country. It
666 was carried out according to the Electoral Law of 1953. The
S nation-wide election was not completed until September, 1954, just
668 in time to meet for voting on the new Constitution. The meetings
666 of the leading local People's Congresses in the Northwest were held on the following dates: (NCNA, August 24, 1954)

Unit	Beginning (1954)	End (1954)	Days of Meeting	Deputies Elected to the National People's Congress
Sian Municipality	July 14	July 17	4	8
Sinkiang Province	July 21	July 31	11	21
Chinghai Province	August 4	August 15	12	9
Shensi Province	August 4	August 12	8	19
Kansu Province	August 16	August 20	5	25

The real meaning of this kind of election was well illustrated in a deputy's confession: "I have never thought of being elected as a deputy to the National People's Congress. Some of my friends ran over the other day to congratulate me, saying, 'Do you know that? You have already received the weighty trust of the people of the whole nation. You are a deputy!'

"When I read my name in the People's Daily I did not know whether I was happy or flurried. My eyes became moist. I was grateful as well as ashamed. I felt that I could hardly catch my breath." (Ts'ao Yü, "I must do my job well as a deputy to the National People's Congress" in Hsin-kuan-ch'a, 1954, No. 18, September 16, p. 3).

VI. The Rights of the Minorities

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668 A. Constitutional Rights
641 In the Common Program of 1949, chapter VI defined the Com-
642 munists' Nationality Policy. In this chapter, it said:
Article 50: All nationalities within the boundaries of the People's Republic of China are equal....

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

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following page 464

Ch'en Shih-yü deputy mayors. All were appointed by the central People's Government. After the abolition of the administrative region in 1954, the Communist Government made these major changes in Northwest China:

(1) Sian was changed from a municipality under central authority to a municipality under the authority of Shensi province.

(2) Ninghsia was made part of Kansu on September 27, 1954.

(3) Sinkiang province was made the Sinkiang Uighur autonomous region on October 1, 1955.

Thus, in 1955 the administrative units of Northwest China were quite different from those of 1950. The units under Shensi, Kansu, and Chinghai are summarized in Table 7. The units under Sinkiang in early 1955 are shown in Table 8, while those after October 1, 1955, are shown in Table 9.

After the promulgation of the Chinese Communist constitution in 1954, elections were held and People's Congresses and People's Councils were organized. There were some personnel changes, but the general structure and control of the government remained about the same.

III. Government of the Autonomous Districts

A. Earlier Systems

In the past, although the Chinese government gave little publicity to them, autonomous governments existed among the minorities in Northwest China. As late as the 1880's, when the proposal to transform Sinkiang into a regular province was presented to the Court, it met with strong opposition on the grounds that the minorities who differed from the Chinese in tradition, language, religion, and customs would be difficult to govern. Before then, the minorities had been governed by their own leaders. Even after the area became a province, the life of the minorities was not greatly disturbed.

B. The Communist System

The Communists have a definite program for changing the social and economic order. Knowing that cooperation is necessary to attain their aims, the Communists intend to lessen the friction between racial groups under their regime. On the surface, they grant autonomous governments to the minorities; in fact, they control them from within through hand-picked Party members. So far there is no evidence to show that the structure of these autonomous local governments is essentially different from that of the regular local governments. The government of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, as well as of the local governments under it, superficially is the same as under the former Sinkiang province. A complete list of all autonomous districts in Northwest China,

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with the local governmental divisions down to the county level, is shown in Table 10.

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TABLE 8,

Administrative Units in Sinkiang Province early in 1955:

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NAME	CAPITAL	ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS
Sinkiang province	Urumchi	4 municipalities 1 branch office 10 special districts 4 autonomous chou (special districts); under these and the regular special districts, there are altogether 75 counties and 4 autonomous areas at the county level

TABLE 9

Administrative Units in Sinkiang Province since October 1, 1955:

NAME	CAPITAL	ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS
Sinkiang Uighur autonomous region	Urumchi	4 municipalities 7 special districts 5 autonomous chou (special districts) with a total, under these and the regular special districts, of 74 counties and 6 autonomous hsien[1]

[1]The three special districts of Ili, T'a-ch'eng (Chuguchak), and Altai were combined to make the Kazakh autonomous chou of Ili. On February 5, 1955, all the self-governing special districts were renamed "autonomous chou" and the self-governing counties were renamed "autonomous hsien."

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TABLE 10

Autonomous Administrative Units at or above the County Level:

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NAME	DESCRIPTION
SINKIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION	Same as the former Sinkiang province
Kazakh autonomous chou of Ili	The three former special districts of Ili, T'a-ch'eng, and Altai (Chuguchak)
Mongol autonomous chou of Pa-yin-ko-leng (Bayankara)	Including the two counties of Ho-shuo and Ho-ching, and the Moslem autonomous hsien of Yen-ch'i
Kirghiz (Kolkoz) autonomous chou of K'e-tzu-le-su (Koslesu)	Including the three counties of A-ho-ch'i, U-ch'a, and A-t'u-shih, and the Tajik autonomous hsien of T'a-shih-k'u-erh
Moslem autonomous chou of Ch'ang-chi (Changki)	Including the three counties of Urumchi, Mi-ch'uan, and Ch'ang-chi
Mongol autonomous chou of Po-erh-t'a-la (Borotala)	Including the three counties of Wen-ch'uan, Chingho, and Po-lo
Sibe (Sibo) autonomous hsien of Ch'a-pu-cha-erh (Chapchal)	In the Ili area
Mongol autonomous hsien of Ho-pu-k'e-sai-erh (Hobukozel)	In the T'a-ch'eng (Chuguchak) area
Kazakh autonomous hsien of Pa-li-k'un (Balikun)	The former county of Ch'eng-hsi
Moslem autonomous hsien of Yen-ch'i (Yenki)	The former county of Yen-ch'i
Kazakh autonomous hsien of Mu-lui	The former county of Mu-lui-ho
Tajik autonomous hsien of T'a-chih-k'u-erh (Tash Qurghan)	An area comprising the former counties of P'u-li, Wu-shih, Ying-chi-sha, and Su-fu

Even with the advent of the Chinese Communists, there was little fundamental change in the composition of the panel of men in the political arena of the Northwest. The men who acquiesced to the Communists and were retained in office as well as those who opposed the Communists were the same men who had been in the political limelight in the past. Some of the men sent out by the Communist Central People's Government were the same men who had been sent out in the past by the Nationalists. The names of local Communist officials appeared to be new, but actually many of them had been in the Northwest for a long time, working in the underground. The old and the new, the local and the Peking-appointed, were all worked into the Administrative Council of the Northwest and the provincial governments. The general election of 1954 resulted in a reshuffle of the political figures of the Northwest, but not in a basic change in the composition.

The situation in the northwestern provinces was in a state of flux in 1949 prior to the actual occupation by the Chinese Communists who were then in the process of conquering all of mainland China. In May, Sian was occupied by Chinese Communist troops, who were posed for their westward advance to gain control of Ninghsia, Chinghai (both of which soon fell to Communist arms), and Sinkiang.

Out in the west, Sinkiang was divided into two political regimes: the adherents of the provincial government and the insurrectionists in Ili. At Urumchi was the headquarters of the Chinese Nationalist Army, under the command of T'ao Chih-yüeh, and the provincial government headed by Burkhan Shahidi, a Russianized Uighur, who was then middle-of-the-road in politics and who represented the large Uighur population. With him was Mehmet Emin Bughra, who had played a part in the establishment of the East Turkestan Republic of 1933 (at Kashgar) as well as in the East Turkestan Republic of 1944 (at Kulja in Ili). Politically, they cooperated with the Nationalist Government and they sought only a modicum of liberties, such as the establishment of a government of their own choosing and the preservation of their languages, culture and traditions. They were thus a less militantly revolutionary group than the Ili faction. In September, 1949, with the defeat of the Nationalists on the mainland, with the Chinese Communist Army preparing to march into Sinkiang, and with the persuasion of such men as Chang Chih-shung, the provincial government under Burkhan and the Nationalist forces under T'ao Chih-yüeh formally submitted to the Communists.

The revolutionary movement centered around Kulja was, since 1948, quiescent, rendered impotent by internal dissensions and the defection of some of its leaders, including Osman Batur. To recoup their fortunes, Akhmejan Kasimi and his lieutenant, Saifuddin, organized the Sinkiang League for the Defense of Peace

669 and Democracy and began to make overtures to the Chinese Com-
175 munists. In September, 1949, Akhmejan Kasimi was killed in a
631 plane crash en route to attend the Chinese People's Political Con-
635 sultative Conference convened by the Chinese Communists.
554 Saifuddin, who was already friendly to the Communists and who may have been an undercover Communist agent, became the head of the Sinkiang League, bringing it formally into the Communist fold and using it to assist the Communist takeover of northern Sinkiang.

175 Even with the submission of civil and military dignitaries of
631 both factions, the situation in Sinkiang was delicate, due to the
635 strong growth of Soviet Russian influence in the political vacuum
648 following the withdrawal of Nationalist power. Actual authority
669 rested in the hands of the Soviet consul-general at Urumchi, the Soviet consul at Kulja, and the secretary-general of the Turkestan branch of the Communist Party. The district of Ili was reported to be wholly Russianized, and by April, 1949, according to Urumchi police records, 6,200 natives changed their nationality to become Soviet citizens. (Mehmet Emin Bughra, Doghr Turkestan, (Eastern Turkestan), pp. 83-4, and interview with Isa Yussuf Aliptakin, in NYT, March 23, 1951). The Chinese Communists were obliged to proceed with caution in their advance on and occupation of Sinkiang.

II. United Front Work, 1. Political Leaders and Factions

175 The fact that the provincial leaders of the Northwest peacefully
668 submitted to the Chinese Communists, bringing the areas under
669 their control along with them and thus sparing the Communists of the effort and cost of a military campaign, posed for the Communist leaders acute problems of absorption and disposition of the local officials. As a reward for their defection to the Communist cause, even though it was, for some of them, at the eleventh hour, they had to be retained in office. However, it was also necessary to reward the Communist officials, who had been working in the underground, as well as the officers of the Communist army, and at the same time, it was necessary to establish control by the Communists over the local functionaries.

175 The Communists, long anticipating this problem, had a ready-
668 made solution. This was the United Front, when applied to everyone in general, and the "democratic coalition" when applied to different factions working together for the Communist government.

"The aims of the Chinese People's Central Government vis-a-vis the Northwest," stated Wang Chen (commander of the Communist forces which entered Sinkiang and concurrently secretary of the Sinkiang Sub bureau of the CCP), were "first, to establish people's provincial governments made up of democratic coalition of all nationalities; second, to enlist progressive elements of all nation-

cadres in the province (JMJP September 24, 1955), but this appeared to be an exaggeration, for an article in the Kuang-ming jih-pao, (by Chang Hung, on September 30, 1955), stated that the number of minority cadres in Sinkiang was 34,400, and that they made up 66.9 per cent of all the cadres in the then province. The total, therefore, comes to 51,543. In Kansu, the total number of cadres up to the end of 1953 was 12,361. In Chinghai, the 3,471 national minority cadres made up 40 per cent of the total number of cadres, so that the total number would be about 8,500.

Early in 1950, Hsi Chung-hsün, vice-chairman of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, stated that there were 50,000 underground cadres plus 200,000 cadres in the People's Liberation Army, or a total of 250,000. Later in the year, it was stated that over 10,000 students and former government functionaries were undergoing reform in the Northwest Cadre Training School, and that 6,000 of them were from the national minorities. A large number of these cadres were purged in 1952-53, but their ranks were filled by graduates from the training schools and colleges. The Northwest Cadre School at Sian, graduated 2,200 in the years 1949-53 and the Northwest Revolutionary University, also at Sian, graduated a total of 12,000 in the period from 1950 to 1953.

Simultaneous with the process of drawing men from schools and government offices into the special training classes, nationality colleges and cadre schools for training, non-Chinese cadres were also assigned jobs in lower levels of the governments so that they could receive practical experience in the administration and also to bear the brunt of contact with local inhabitants. By fall of 1950, there were about 4,400 native cadres employed in local government agencies, half of whom held offices above the level of hsiang. By spring of 1951, according to incomplete figures, the number of national minority cadres in government increased to 22,000, distributed in the five Northwest provinces as follows, (NCNA, May 13, 1951):

Sinkiang	17,000
Chinghai	2,000
Kansu	1,976
Ninghsia	1,050
Sian Municipality	40

The 17,000 administrative personnel in Sinkiang were the same veteran cadres who took part in the 1944 Ili Revolt and who were organized into the Sinkiang People's Democratic League headed by Saifuddin (JMJP, June 6, 1952; also statement of Wang Feng, December 29, 1951). It was also claimed that seventy to eighty per cent of the personnel in the magistrates' offices in the 80 counties of Sinkiang were native cadres. By the end of 1951, the number of national minority cadres employed in government work

in the Northwest reached the highwater mark of 27,000 (NCNA January 8, 1952).

A large number of the cadres were sent out directly from training schools to low-ranking positions in the people's governments. Up to the summer of 1953 the Northwest Revolutionary University at Sian placed over 12,000 of its graduates in government service, the Northwest Nationality College 2,573, the Lanchou Nationality College 2,500, and the Northwest Cadre School 2,200. The areas of concentration in Sinkiang were the Ili and Kashgar Administrative Districts and three counties in Yarkand which had 6,907 native cadres employed as directors of departments, section chiefs, and heads of counties and ch'ü (districts).

B. Demoralization and Conflict of the Cadres

A compelling reason for the large-scale induction of cadres, both Chinese and from the national minorities, was not only because of the small number of veteran cadres, but also because these old cadres were no longer considered trustworthy and useful by the authorities. However, the authorities soon found that the new cadres were not any better and their absorption only heightened the conflict within the ranks of the cadres. The defects of the cadres were repeatedly pointed out in the series of conferences convened by the Department of United Front Work of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party in the fall of 1951 and in the spring of 1952. The main shortcomings of the cadres, as pointed out by the Communist leaders, were:

1. Lack of political consciousness and demoralization of the old party cadres. It was significant, and perhaps paradoxical, that the major criticisms against the cadres were directed against the veteran cadres who had been trained and who had seen service in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, which since 1935 had been the center of Communist activities and the showcase of Communist administration. As early as January, 1950, Ma Wen-jui, director of the Organization Department of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, charged in a speech (JMJP January 4, 1950),that the old cadres showed restlessness, they wanted better jobs and were anxious to return home, they suffered from the ideological defects of individualism and jealousy of the new cadres, they were inefficient and careless in their work so that they lost important documents and often divulged state secrets, they lacked initiative and a sense of responsibility, and sought only enjoyment. Cases of graft were quite frequent.

Eighteen months later, at a conference of high-ranking cadres held at Sian in August, 1951, Ma Wen-jui charged that the old party cadres, due to their long stay in the rural villages and due to the demoralizing conditions of the war, lack education. "The degrees of political awakening of some of the party members is

of the cadres had a corroding effect on the party and endangered the party cause." (NCNA July 21, 1954). But, said the leaders, "the main obstacle to party unity in Sinkiang district at present is the survival of the tendency of Great Hanism and the sentiment of local nationalism among a section of the cadres." (NCNA April 25, 1954).

The demoralization of the government personnel in the Northwest was so widespread that in March, 1954, when the residents of thirty-two villages in the Hu-chu county in Chinghai were told that they were free to voice their grievances, they made a total of 3,800 complaints in the hsiang people's representative assembly against the "bureaucratic work style of the leadership cadres." (NCNA March 20, 1954).

V. Political Structure and Political Progress

A. The Northwest Military and Administrative Council and People's Governments

Early in 1950, the Northwest Military and Administrative Council was established at Sian, which also became the location of the Northwest Bureau of the Communist Party and of the headquarters of the Northwest Military District. In the months that followed, provincial and municipal people's governments were also established in the five provinces then comprising the Northwest: Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, Ninghsia, and Sinkiang.

While the members of the Military and Administrative Council were appointed by the Central People's Government in Peking, the members of the provincial and municipal people's governments were, according to Communist pronouncements, elected by conventions of representatives of all circles and all nationalities. Since no machinery of election was set up and the people were not instructed, these conventions were actually meetings of Communists and fellow travellers who were invited to attend, in the manner non-Communists were invited to attend the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Peking in September, 1949.

Since the officials were those on the panels who were approved by the Communists, there was little for the representatives to do except to endorse the selection, and then to devote the rest of their time to other unrelated items of the agenda. The first conference of the people's representatives of all circles and all nationalities in Sinkiang, which met April 19 to May 10, 1951, was primarily devoted to the purpose of propaganda, the discussion of means of popularizing the Resist-America and Aid-Korea Campaign, the campaign to suppress counter-revolutionaries and the land reform. The meeting of representatives in Chinghai, held in October, 1950, discussed these items on the agenda plus the means of collecting the grain tax.

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lishment of the Hai-pei Tibetan Autonomous People's Government in Chinghai came only after the "achievement of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Government at upper level."

"On entering the Tibetan area in Hai-pei in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party and the cadres of the People's Government exerted great efforts in propaganda, thoroughly carried out policies concerning national equality, unity and the development of production, mediated disputes... and stabilized social order." (NCNA June 18, 1954).

As one after another of the national autonomous areas proved satisfactory, from the point of view of the Communists, more were established. Following the establishment of the T'ien-chu Tibetan Autonomous district in Kansu in May, 1950, eight autonomous districts were established in 1950: five in Kansu, two in Ninghsia, and one in Chinghai. Three were established in the years 1951 and 1952, all in Chinghai. Fifteen were set up in 1953: six in Kansu, two in Ninghsia, and eight in Chinghai. Of the total of 27 autonomous districts set up by the end of 1953, 14 were Tibetan, five Chinese Moslem (Hui), four Mongol, and four others. Including the smaller autonomous areas, there were a total of over forty autonomous people's governments in the three provinces of Kansu, Chinghai, and Ninghsia, by August, 1953. Their size varied. In Chinghai, the Kung-ho Kazakh autonomous hsiang had a total population of 130 and the Huang-nan Tibetan Autonomous district a population of 220,000. These nationality autonomous areas in the three provinces embraced a total of 700,000 people, or one-ninth of the non-Chinese population in the Northwest (NCNA August 29, 1953 and September 9, 1953; but one million according to Ma Ming-fang, Ch'ün-chung jih-pao, January 1, 1954).

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The people of Sinkiang, who constituted the bulk of the non-Chinese population in the Northwest, were, up to fall of 1953, four years after the Communist conquest, not granted the privilege of self-rule. Some of the reasons for the discrimination of Sinkiang were quite obvious.

1. The propinquity of the provinces of Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai and the predominance of the Chinese population made it easier for the Communists to exercise control. Sinkiang, on the other hand, was farther from China and the bulk of the population was non-Chinese with a long tradition of resistance to Chinese rule.

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2. In Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai, Chinese cadres far outnumbered the native cadres, but in Sinkiang, according to one source (Kuang-ming jih-pao, September 30, 1955), 67 per cent of the cadres were native cadres, including 17,000 of them who had taken part in the Ili Revolt in 1944-45. The fact that they still entertained separatist views may be seen in the fact that Saifuddin, their leader, found it necessary to remind them: "From now on, the

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631 problem is no longer one concerned with opposition to pan-racialism (i.e., Great Hanism), but rather how to cooperate with the... Chinese in struggling for the building of a free big family and in opposing petty nationalism and the saboteurs of national solidarity." (JMJP October 2, 1951).

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162 3. Up to the end of 1953, it was reported that there were a total of 2,800,000 organized peasant households in the Northwest, or 45 per cent of the total number of peasant households (Ch'un-chung jih-pao, January 1, 1954). The bulk of the number of organized peasants were in the interior provinces, while in Sinkiang only
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162 33.8 per cent of the peasant households were organized. Not only the percentage in Sinkiang, but also the average percentage of the whole of the Northwest, compared rather unfavorably with the 77.32 per cent in Inner Mongolia.

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[476] The figures on Table 4 are numbers of farming households in the Northwest, which were organized into farmers associations and into mutual aid teams up to December, 1953, based on statistics appearing in the Communist press. (Figures in parentheses are computed from percentages given of the total).

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648 4. An important factor, too, was the special position of Soviet Russia in Sinkiang. Soviet authorities had succeeded in gaining a foothold in Chinese Turkestan during the administration of Sheng Shih-ts'ai and later in the political vacuum attendant upon the withdrawal of Nationalist influence in 1948-49. Soviet troops were stationed at strategic points and Soviet party and consular officials actually held the reins of power. Soviet interests were confirmed in the treaty signed between Peking and Moscow in February, 1950, to which were attached two codicils providing for the organization of two joint stock companies for Soviet exploitation of the oil and mineral resources in Sinkiang (not excluding the possibility of the mining and shipment of uranium ores to the Soviet Union). To implement these agreements, large numbers of Soviet experts arrived to set up machine works, power plants,and to assist the Chinese in the work of geological survey, veterinary and medical research, the operation of trucking lines and state farms, cotton production, insect eradication and sheep-raising (NCNA interview with Burkhan, Kuang-ming Jih-pao, September 27, 1955). In the face of Soviet domination of Sinkiang, it was difficult for Communist China to assert its rule, except nominally, in that remote province.

It was with the death of Stalin that there was, ostensibly, a reappraisal of Soviet relations with Communist China. During the visit of Nikita Khruschev and Nikolai Bulganin to Peking in October, 1954, the pattern of Sino-Soviet partnership was readjusted to make it more palatable to the ego of the Chinese leaders. In regard to Sinkiang, one of the five agreements reached as a result of the Peking talks was for the sale of Soviet shares in the two joint stock companies to Communist China, transforming them into

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175 Chinese-owned companies. Although Soviet and Eastern European
648 experts were retained as salaried technicians, the move was made to appear that Soviet Russia was withdrawing from Sinkiang in favor of Communist China.

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175 In addition to these conditions, there was a whole plethora of
668 other factors which made the Communist authorities reluctant to
642 grant regional autonomy to the people of Sinkiang. However, as
631 they had in repeated pronouncements promised autonomy to the
563 non-Chinese inhabitants of this province, they found that they could not procrastinate any longer, and in the late summer of 1953 they finally agreed to the establishment of the first autonomous people's governments in Sinkiang, but on an experimental basis. The three experimental autonomous governments were: one for the Sibo on the hsiang level, one for the Chinese Moslems on the county level, and one for the Mongols on the district (ch'ü)level. In December, 1953, Saifuddin urged "that a good job must be done to guarantee that the various national autonomies in the province may be established." (Ch'un-chung jih-pao, January 6, 1954).

The experiments proved successful and by May, 1954, the green light was given for the establishment of autonomous people's governments in Sinkiang for other concentrations of national minorities in the province. There were thirty-three autonomous areas below the level of district in Sinkiang in August (NCNA, August 7, 1954). However, in proportion to its population of non-Chinese people, Sinkiang was still behind. During the same period, the number of autonomous areas in Kansu had increased to 86 (NCNA April 9, 1955).

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*175 C. The General Election of 1953-54
*668 In 1953, the people of Northwest China, as elsewhere in China,
666 were for the first time permitted to cast their votes for the elec-
E41) tion of their representatives. In February, the Central People's Government in Peking passed the Election Law which provided for suffrage for adults over 18 years of age with the exclusion of all those whom the Communist authorities had classified as landlords, counter-revolutionaries, and lunatics and those who were deprived of the right to vote or to run for election. The certified voters vote only once, at the lowest or basic levels, and by a show of hands (art. 55). The system is pyramidal. The representatives chosen by the people at the basic election elect their representatives to people's congresses of a higher level, and these in turn elect representatives for peoples of still higher level, and so on up, through the levels of county and district people's congresses to municipal and provincial congresses, and through the level of municipal and provincial congresses to the National People's Congress. Only at high levels was the balloting secret. The candidates running for election were Communist or men approved by the

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Table 6. CADRES ASIGNED TO AND TRAINED FOR COOPERATIVE WORK

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	Total No. of Cadres	Number of Native Cadres	Cadres Assigned to Cooperatives	Cadres to be trained for cooperative work
Shensi			20,000	200,000
Chinghai	8,500	3,400	3,100	7,300
Sinkiang	51,000	34,400	27,000	
Kansu (no figures available)				

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*175 B. Transfer of Cadres
*668 The vast expansion of cooperatives and the intensification of
474 the collectivization of the people demanded an increase in the num-
476 ber of cadres to supervise them. The number of cadres assigned to the task of cooperative building and the number of cadres to be trained for such work up to the fall of 1955 are shown in Table 6.

The assignment of the large number of cadres to the rural areas was, according to Chang Chih-chung, "to consolidate the mutual aid teams and producers cooperative work under a policy of active leadership." (Ch'un-chung jih-pao, January 1, 1954). However, the demoralization, the lack of discipline, the incompetence and low degree of political consciousness of the cadres when employed as officials of the people's governments during the first four years of Communist rule have not only impeded government and party work but also incurred ill-feeling among the people. The assignment of the cadres to the cooperatives in rural areas was to remove them from sensitive positions in the government.

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*175 Consequently, by 1955, when the work of the cadres in direc-
*668 ting the elections was over, there were few cadres left in the
*563 upper levels of government. This was particularly the case of
631 the national minority cadres. In Chinghai, out of the 3,400 native cadres, only 93 held responsible positions in the party organization in December, 1954, and in Sinkiang, only a third of the
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175 cadres in party committees on all levels were natives, two-thirds
668 were Chinese. In the government and in state enterprises, the
563 number of national cadres was even less. According to Wang
• 631 En-mao, secretary of the Sinkiang Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, only 682 out of the 34,400 national minority cadres held responsible positions in the governments above the levels of county, although it was claimed in other Communist publications that 84.6 per cent of the cadres in government offices below county levels were natives. In the state commercial, animal products, tea, silk, and export enterprises, 63 per cent of the officials were Chinese. One of the reasons for the demotion of the national minority cadres was their lack of education and training. Burkhan, governor of Sinkiang, seeking to rationalize this state of affairs, said that of the 36,000 national minority cadres (his figure) trained in all fields of work since 1949, only 2,500 showed enough initiative to be promoted to be leadership cadres. (JMJP September 24, 1955).

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*175 To bolster the position of the Chinese cadres and to fill the
*668 ranks depleted by the transfer of local cadres to the work of col-
166 lectivizing the peasant population, large numbers of cadres and workers were sent to the Northwest from the coastal provinces. The figures of Table 7, gathered from scattered items in the Communist press, are incomplete, but they give an idea of the horde of cadres and approved workers and students pouring into the northwestern provinces during 1955. [TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 523]

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177 under the leadership of the local party and government organs."
668 (JMJP, August 28, 1954).
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563 Finally, in August, 1955, when out of the total of thirty-three
631 autonomous areas in Sinkiang below the rank of districts, four were raised to the status of chou and six to the status of districts, it was announced that Sinkiang would be made into the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region in September.

Large numbers of dignitaries journeyed from Peking to attend the second session of the Sinkiang People's Political Consultative Conference at Urumchi, where the change in the status of Sinkiang was proclaimed on September 20. Among them was vice-premier Tung Pi-wu, who, in his address, told the local leaders that the bases for the establishment of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region lay in elevation of the patriotism and socialist consciousness of the people, the training and employment of large numbers of cadres, and on the degree of unity among the nationalities. To preserve and consolidate the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, he said, the people of Sinkiang must (1) welcome the assistance of the Han Chinese cadres, (2) actively assist the other nationality autonomous areas in construction, (3) pay serious attention to education in patriotism and socialism and prevent the tendency of great nation and provincial nationalism, and (4) consolidate national unity and wipe out the counter-revolutionaries. (NCNA September 21, 1955).

175 Burkhan, in his speech, elaborated on the statements of Tung
177 Pi-wu by saying that the main task of the Chinese Communist
668 Party on the problem of nationalities during the transitional
642 period was to consolidate the unity of the fatherland and the
563 solidarity among the nationalities in a common effort to build the big family of the fatherland and to follow the centralized leadership of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the Central People's Government, the Sinkiang Sub-bureau of the Communist Party and the provincial people's government. Just as the Uighurs, who are the majority people in Sinkiang, need the help and support of the Han Chinese of China Proper, so the other minority peoples, such as the Kazakhs in Ili, need the help and support of the Uighurs.

"With the establishment of the Uighur autonomous region in Sinkiang, we should all the more warmly welcome the sincere and selfless help extended by the Han Chinese and cadres of brother nationalities. This is because the Han Chinese and their cadres have gone through a long period of revolutionary training and experience.... Only under the unified guidance of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the Central People's Government, and the party committee in the autonomous region as well as the warm help of the Han Chinese and cadres, and further efforts to consolidate and strengthen unity among the

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*175 "Under a call of the correct nationalities policy, Hsiang Ch'ien
*668 yielded to the people in Chiencha in the afternoon of July 11, and
669 arrived at Sining on July 31....
579 "The Chinghai Provincial People's Government has appointed
Hsiang Ch'ien to continue to hold the post of chieftain."

S 7. In an article entitled "The great achievements of People's
175 Sinkiang during the past three years", in Sinkiang jih-pao, January
668 1, 1953, Burhan, the governor of Sinkiang, gave the following report:
669 "During the past three years, (1949-1952)...we have wiped out
579 more than 20,000 of the remnant of the KMT bandits, basically
cleared out the hidden spies...."

8. In the same paper, in April of 1953 there appeared the following:

N "(NCNA Lanchow April 6, 1953)...Northwest Regional Admin-
*175 istration Council called a meeting of the Kazakh chiefs along the
*563 border of Kansu, Chinghai, Sinkiang at Lanchow from March 23,
*668 to April 3, 1953....The Kazakh chief A-t'ung-pai-k'e said: 'In
669 the past, being deceived by the bad people and believing in the
S rumors, we did not cooperate with the People's government. In-
175 stead of punishing us for our past faults, you are now helping us...'"
563 The above cases all clearly indicated political disturbances.
668 Judging by what has been revealed here, the Communists did try
669 to modify their laws and standards to woo the minority groups.
They also did use the minority people as their own agents to police as well as to pacify the resisting minorities.

N 9. (NCNA Sian, February 28, 1955)
*175 "According to statistics of the people's procuratorates in 48
*668 administrative districts, hsien, and municipalities, 3,500 cases were taken on in 1954."

625 10. (Urumchi Sinkiang jih-pao, January 20, 1955)
694 "The Provincial Public Security Department has also dispatched
631 five work teams to various places and adopted a combined policy of
S carrying out penetrating detection, investigation and research to-
175 gether with the resettling of vagrants and the pronouncing of sen-
668 tences with great fanfare. According to incomplete data from
625 various localities during the past 11 months, 71.7% of the crimi-
694 nal cases have been brought to light. The data from the two spe-
• 631 cial districts of Tacheng (Chuguchak) and Altai, from the two municipalities of Ining and Kuche as well as from Shache hsien reveal that a total of 25 major criminal cases have been unearthed."

11. (Urumchi Sinkiang jih-pao, January 20, 1955)
S "Judging from the events that have taken place in our province
175 during the past year, there are still some habitual robbers, habit-
668 ual thieves and other criminal culprits who have not been disposed
674 of. Some elements who have gone through reform through labor or who have been released on termination of sentences still refuse to repent and continue to jeopardize social order. Some landlords

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China
Sinkiang AI1

BIOGRAPHIES OF KEY PERSONALITIES

Burkhan Shahidi
Chinese name: Pao-erh-han

159 Burkhan was the last governor of Sinkiang under the Nationalist Government, and the first governor of Sinkiang under the Communist regime. He is a Uighur, born in 1894 at Aqsu, Sinkiang. In 1912 he went to Berlin, Germany, and in 1916 was graduated from the University of Berlin specializing in economics and political science. Following his return from Germany, he took different positions in the local government in Sinkiang. Under the administration of Governor Chin Shu-jen (1927-1933) he was in charge of foreign affairs. Later he was sent to Germany again to investigate political and economic conditions. Under the administration of Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai, for some time, he served as commissioner in the Altai (A-shan) region. In 1937 he was appointed by the Nationalist Government as the consul to Saizan, Soviet Central Asia. When he returned home the next year he was accused by Governor Sheng as a German spy and was imprisoned for seven years until the end of 1944, when Governor Sheng was relieved of his governorship.

159 669 631 In the early stages of the Sinkiang disturbances, which lasted from 1944 to 1949, Burkhan played a rather insignificant role. Under the administration of Governor Wu Chung-hsin, 1944-1945, he served as deputy commissioner for civil affairs, and later as the political commissioner of the first region. When the Sinkiang disorders developed to such an extent that the Central government had to send a special representative, General Chang Chih-chung, to Sinkiang with the hope of settling the differences between the rebellious tribes in Ining and the so-called Youth Corps of Eastern Turkestan, Chang Chih-chung succeeded Wu Chung-hsin as Governor of Sinkiang in 1946, and Burkhan was appointed as one of the lieutenant governors.

The Sinkiang situation continued to develop from bad to worse. Unable to solve the complicated problem, Chang Chih-chung in 1947 recommended Maksud Sabri (Mai-ssu-wu-te) a member of the Kuomintang and a minority leader in Sinkiang, for governor. In May 1947 the Central government appointed Maksud in the hope that he, being a native, could better handle the situation. Rebellious forces, however, aimed their attack at Maksud. At this crucial time, Burkhan suggested to Chang [648] Chih-chung, who was still political chief for the Nationalist Government in the Northwest, that the only possible way to settle the Sinkiang problem and improve relations between Sinkiang and the Soviet Union was to remove General Sung Hsi-lien,

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159 military commander of the Nationalist forces in Sinkiang. He
669 further hinted that he might be in a position to persuade Russian
648 authorities to render help for developing Sinkiang under Chang's
• 631 leadership. Thereupon Chang Chih-chung recommended Burkhan as a member of the State Council of the Nationalist Government in Nanking, and sent him to Nanking to negotiate with the Soviet ambassador. By December 2, 1948, a secret agreement was reached between Burkhan, as personal representative of Chang Chih-chung, and the Soviet ambassador. The prerequisite of the secret treaty was the removal of the Nationalist commander, Sung Hsi-lien. The important clauses included closer cooperation between Chang Chih-chung and the Chinese Communist Party for the purpose of liberating Sinkiang, and in return, the government of the Soviet Union would give assistance toward reconstruction of Sinkiang. Chang had no choice but to remove both General Sung Hsi-lien and Governor Maksud, and recommend Burkhan as governor of Sinkiang. On December 31, 1948, the Central Government formally appointed Burkhan.

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159 On January 10, 1949, Burkhan officially took over the office.
648 In his open letter to the peoples of Sinkiang, Burkhan stressed
631 the pro-Russia attitude of General Chang Chih-chung. When Chang called a conference of the political and military chiefs in the Northwest, rumors spread that Sinkiang would be given to the Soviet Union or was preparing to surrender to the Communists. When Burkhan returned from the conference he denied all these rumors. By March 1949, the entire situation in the interior of China had made a drastic change. In Sinkiang, prices had

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[458] become extremely high. Burkhan proclaimed his policy of economic self-sufficiency in Sinkiang by issuing silver dollars and silver dollar notes as the new currency and discontinuing use of National gold yüan notes. In May of the same year, Burkhan extended the Sino-Russian Aviation Pact for another five years.

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159 In the meantime Manchuria had been taken by the Communists,
668 and the whole of north China was also put under the control of
669 the Communists with the surrender of General Fu Tso-i, while
631 in Central China, a Soviet regime was also formed. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek announced his retirement from his presidency, and General Li Tsung-jen, vice-president of the Nationalist Government, took over the power and began to negotiate peace with the Communists.

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* [668] In July, 1949, the Communist troops had begun to move into
[669] Kansu Province. On September 23, 1949, the Communist general, Wang Chen, received the surrender of the Nationalist troops at Chiu-ch'uan, Kansu Province. On September 25, two days after the surrender, Burkhan, together with the commander of the Nationalist troops in Sinkiang, cabled to Peiping to announce their severance of relationship from the Nationalist

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159 Government and their readiness to receive orders from the new
668 regime in Peiping. On October 1, 1949, General T'ao Ch'ih-
669 yueh, the commander of the Nationalist garrison in Sinkiang,
• 631 went to Chiu-ch'uan to welcome the arrival of the Communist general, Wang, Chen, in Sinkiang. On October 2, General P'ang Te-huai flew to Urumchi (Tihua) with General Chang Chih-chung. Burkhan was thus appointed by the Communist regime as the new governor of the people's government of Sinkiang. In October
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[643] 1955, he was elected chairman of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region.

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159 Burkhan was a member of the NW MAC, but unlike most of
668 the other officials, he held few concurrent posts. Those he held
631 were president of the Sinkiang College of Nationalities, an institution for the training of native cadres, chairman of the Chinese Islamic Association, and a member of the Chinese People's Committee for the Protection of Children. His name was missing from the list of notables invited to attend the CPPCC held in Peking in September, 1949, and it was not until the third session of the CPPCC in 1951 that he became a delegate to that body. In 1955, he was deputy chairman of the Second National Committee of the CPPCC, the function of which had already been superceded by the National People's Congress. His name was also absent from the list of members of the presidium of the National People's Congress meeting, held in September 1954.

These facts as well as reports from escapees from Sinkiang indicate that Burkhan was probably only a figurehead in the political structure of Sinkiang under the Communists. In his speeches, however, he has denounced the separatist aspirations of his peoples as well as pan-Turkestanism and pan-Islamism, long unifying forces in the struggle of the Turkish peoples of Sinkiang, and has repeatedly and vigorously supported the unity of Sinkiang with the rest of China. He was also one of the vice-presidents of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. He relinquished the office as governor of Sinkiang in September 1955, but when, a month later, Saifuddin resigned, he became governor of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region.

N Cha Hsi: Tibetan, Communist
159 Cha Hsi, a Tibetan, served as a member of the Committee
*668 of Nationalities during the period of Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia
631 Border Government from 1937-1945; at the end of 1949, he was appointed a member of the same committee in the Central People's Government, and also appointed a member of the Military and Political Council for the Northwest and concurrently a member of the Committee of Nationalities in that council. The council was re-organized in 1953 into the Northwest Administrative

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159 Administrative Council. Reelected Governor of Shensi in 1954.
*668 Chao's career as an army officer was highlighted at three
701 different occasions: First he took part in the coup d'etat against
631 Chiang Kai-shek during the Sian incident; then he became a war hero in the Sino-Japanese War for his campaign in the Chung t'iao Mountains along the Shensi border, and finally when he shifted his allegiance to the Communists in 1947, he was instrumental in appealing to the Northwestern troops to revolt against Chiang's regime. His appointment as Governor of Chinghai and then Shensi by the Communist regime was a recognition of his service to the Communist cause.

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159 Chia T'o-fu: Communist, government official
*668 Background unknown, dates unknown. During the Sino-Japan-
631 ese War he served as the secretary-general to the Northwest Office of the Central Political Bureau of the Communist Party; 1948, member of the Financial and Economic Committee of the North China People's Government; later secretary to the Municipal Committee of Sian. 1950, mayor of Sian; 1950-52, member of the Financial and Economic Committee of the Government Administration Council in the Central People's Government, and vice-chairman of the Financial and Economic Committee of the Military and Administrative Council of the Northwest; since 1952, vice-chairman of the Financial and Economic Committee of the Government Administrative Council, member of the Northwest Administrative Council and concurrently vice-chairman of the Financial and Economic Committee of the Northwest Administrative Council. Chairman of the Northwest Headquarters of the Federation of Trade Unions, and vice-president of the Northwest Branch of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. Also a member of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP.

In 1955 he was promoted to director of the Fourth General Office (Light Industries, Fuel) and concurrently Minister of Light Industries in the State Council of the Central People's Government.

Chia is one of the principal officials responsible for the economic development and industrialization of the Northwest.

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159 Ch'ü, Wu: Government official
668 Head of the Office of Civil Affairs in the Sinkiang Provincial
631 Government under the Nationalists; 1949, mayor of Urumchi, member of the Sinkiang People's Government Council; 1950, deputy secretary general in the Government Administration Council; 1953, member of the Northwest Administrative Council; 1955, deputy secretary-general of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Member of the Executive Committee of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.

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Forces in Korea; 1955, deputy director of the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army.

Kao Chin-shun: Communist Party member

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Background unknown. When the Communists took over Sinkiang in late 1949, he was chosen as one of the two vice-chairmen of the People's Government of Sinkiang. He is now vice-chairman of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region and second secretary of the Sinkiang Committee of the CCP.

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Li Ching-lin

Background and dates unknown. 1949-53, member of the Military and Administrative Council for the Northwest, and vice-chairman of the People's Government of Ninghsia; 1953-54, member of the Northwest Administrative Council and vice-chairman of the People's Government of Ninghsia.

Liao Han-sheng: Communist Party member

A native of Hupeh Province, dates unknown. A political commissar of the People's Liberation Army; in 1949 he was appointed a member of the Military and Administrative Council for the Northwest, and concurrently one of the vice-chairmen of the People's Government of Chinghai Province until the election of 1954. When the council was reorganized in 1953 into the Northwest Administrative Council, he continued as a member.

Lo I: Communist official and mass organization leader

Background unknown; member of the commission on political and legal affairs, land reform and people's supervision in the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, and member of the standing committee of the Central Committee of the New Democratic Youth League. Member of the All-China Democratic Youth Association. In charge of youth work for the CCP in the Northwest.

Ma, Hsi-wu

Background unknown. In 1952 he was president of the Northwest court of the Supreme People's Court, and member in the Political and Legal Commission and the Land Reform Commission of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council. 1955, vice-president of the Supreme Court in Peking.

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Ma Hung-k'uei (1893-)

In the study of the modern history of Northwest China under the Nationalist administration, particularly the history of the provinces of Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai, special attention must be directed to the history and background of the Ma clan,

Maksud Sabri: (1887-)
Chinese name: Mai-ssu-wu-te

159 Among all the different tribes in modern Sinkiang, and particularly among the Uighurs, Maksud is one of the most loyal supporters of the Nationalist Government. He was born at I-ning in 1887. After he had received his Moslem education at the Moslem school in Ili, he went to Turkey where he received comprehensive training including military, medical and scientific studies, at the Constantinople University. When he came back to Sinkiang, he established a number of schools and the Altai hospital. In addition, he encouraged the program for the ahungs (Moslem priests) to study their scripture, and other social welfare. By 1936 he was elected a member of the Kuo- [631] mintang Central Executive Committee. Since then he has held such positions as member of the Legislative Yüan, councillor of the Central Government, and representative to the People's Political Council. Later he was appointed Commissioner for the Control Yüan in Sinkiang. On May 19, 1947, he was appointed [635] governor of Sinkiang upon the recommendation of General Chang Chih-chung.

159 669 635 668 This appointment came at the most crucial time, when the province was politically chaotic. The tribes of Sinkiang, particularly the Kazakhs and Uighurs, were agitating for independence. By January 1945 the so-called Republic of Eastern Turkestan was formally set up in I-ning with the aim of taking over the whole of Sinkiang. At the same time, the Communist Party in Sinkiang was officially organized, and the army of the Republic of Eastern Turkestan was formed. By 1946, a number of cities in northern and western Sinkiang had been lost to the rebels. To cope with such a crisis, the Nationalist Government at Nanking sent General Chang Chih-chung to Sinkiang to negotiate with the I-ning representatives with the hope that the local affair could be settled peacefully. After a number of talks, a peace agreement was finally signed between Chang Chih-chung and the I-ning representatives on January 2, 1946. As a result of this peace agreement, the provincial government of Sinkiang was reorganized with an equal number of members from Uighurs and Chinese in the local government. The peace treaty did not, however, prevent the rebels from further disturbances. Anti-government movements were found everywhere in the province, whereas the so-called Eastern Turkestan Youth Corps was organized throughout the entire Sinkiang. Unable to tackle the situation, Chang finally recommended Maksud as governor of Sinkiang, hoping that, being a minority leader, he might be able to solve the problems.

Maksud took over the administration in May 1947, but the I-ning group continued its revolt. At the same time the Pei-t'a-

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159 P'an Tzu-li: Communist Party member
*668 Native of Shensi; dates and background unknown. A long-
631 time member of the Communist Party; served as secretary to the Provincial Committee of Ninghsia of the Communist Party. Since 1949, served as the chairman of the People's Government of Ninghsia Province, and director of the Political Bureau of the People's Liberation Army. 1951, member of the Military and Political Council for the Northwest and vice-chairman of the People's Government of Shensi Province. From 1953, member of the reorganized Northwest Administrative Council and con-
N currently vice-chairman of the People's Government of Shensi
[648] Province. In October 1955 he was appointed Chinese Communist ambassador to North Korea, and in the spring of 1956 he was transferred as ambassador to India.

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159 Inasmuch as Chao Shou-shan, governor of Shensi, is not a
*668 Communist but only a political figurehead, the actual power in Shensi was in the hands of P'an Tzu-li. While vice-governor of Shensi, P'an was responsible for mobilizing the people and pre paring for the elections. He pushed through the campaign for the suppression of counter-revolutionaries and also expedited the judicial process, clearing seventeen thousand cases from the dockets in a couple of months.

000 Pao-erh-han
See Burkhan Shahidi

P'eng, Te-huai
See General Handbook

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159 Saifuddin Azizi: Communist, government official
668 Born 1914 in Sinkiang. A Uighur. Studied in the Central Asiatic University in Soviet Russia, majoring in law and political science. Commissioner of education in the provincial government of Sinkiang under Chang Chih-chung's administration, 1946
S and 1947. Member and representative to the first People's Poli-
159 tical Consultative Council, 1949, delegate to the CPPCC. Mem-
668 ber in the Central People's Government Council, and vice-chair-
• 631 man of the Commission on Nationality Affairs, 1950, and member of the Political and Legal Commission of the Central People's Government and member of the Constitution-Drafting Commission. In September-November 1955 he served as vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and a member of the National Defense Council.

In the Northwest, he was a member of the Military and Administrative Council, in which he served as a member in the Political and Legal Commission and the Nationality Affairs Commission. In 1953, when the MAC became the Northwest Adminis-

159 668 631 trative Council, he became vice-chairman of the council. In the province of Sinkiang, he was from 1950 to 1955 vice-chairman of the provincial People's Government, director of the Commission on Nationality Affairs in the Provincial People's Government, and commander of the Fifth Army. In 1955 he was elected chairman of the first session of the Sinkiang People's Political Consultative Committee, which did the ground work in preparing the establishment of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region. In October 1955, when the SUAR was formally inaugurated, he was elected the chairman, but after a month, for reasons unknown, he resigned and Burkhan Shahidi again became chairman.

Saifuddin's membership in the Chinese Communist Party was disclosed in 1950, but he may have been an undercover agent before. He served as the fourth secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau of the CCP (later reorganized as the Sinkiang Committee) from 1950.

In the mass organizations, Saifuddin is chairman of the Sinkiang People's Democratic League and he was also a member of the national committee of the China Peace Committee, an organization formed to carry out the Resist-America-Aid-Korea campaign. Since December 1954 he has been one of the vice-presidents of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.

159 668 [669] Saifuddin's rise to recognition started from the revolt at Ili in 1944 when the so-called People's Committee for the Republic of Eastern Turkestan was organized in opposition to the provincial government of Sinkiang and also to the Nationalist Government. Saifuddin was appointed Minister of Education at that time and was also in charge of the Youth Corps. By January 1945 the Republic of Eastern Turkestan was formally established. Saifuddin was one of the lieutenants of Akmedjan Kasimi, a leader in the Ili coalition, who in 1948 organized his supporters into the Sinkiang League for the Defense of Peace and Democracy, and became editor of its organ, The Progressive Daily. When Akhmedjan and two others were killed in a plane crash en route to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Peking in September 1949, Saifuddin assumed the leadership of the Sinkiang League which, in 1950, was renamed the Sinkiang People's Democratic League and which furnished seventeen thousand experienced minority cadres to staff the government agencies in Sinkiang. Through their efforts, the Ili region in Sinkiang forged ahead of the rest of the province in land reform, in collectivization, in the recruitment of activists into the ranks of the cadres, and in meeting the requirements for the establishment of regional autonomy.

How trustworthy and loyal are the members of the Sinkiang League to the Communist cause is, however, still a question. The fact that many of them still entertain separatist opinions

000 one of the vice-chairmen of the Kansu PPCC.

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701 T'ao Ch'ih-yueh: Army officer

A native of Hunan, dates unknown. Graduate of Whampao Military Academy; 1936, commanding officer of the Eighth Division, Nationalist Army; 1945-49, commander of the Sinkiang Garrison; 1949-, deputy commander of the Communist forces in the Sinkiang Military Area, and commanding officer of the 22nd Army Group; 1949-, member of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council and member of the Government Council of the People's Government of Sinkiang; 1951-, member of the National Committee, People's Political Consultative Conference; 1953-, member of the Northwest Administrative Council.

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701 During the Nationalist administration, T'ao was never in a very important position in the army. His rise to fame began when General Chang Chih-chung, representing the Nationalist Government, conducted peace talks with the local leaders of Sinkiang from 1946-1949. At this time T'ao, succeeding General Sung Hsi-lien, became the commander of the garrison forces in Sinkiang. When the defense of the Northwest by the Nationalist

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668 troops was broken down by the victorious Communist army, T'ao took the lead of all military and political leaders of Sinkiang to switch his allegiance and support to the Communist regime in Peking. On September 26, 1949, he made his public announcement in which he separated Sinkiang's relationship from the Nationalist regime and gave his whole support to the Peking regime. And on October 1, 1949, he went to Chiu-ch'uan, Kansu, to welcome the commanding officer of the People's Liberation Army, General Wang Chen, to Sinkiang. His troops were then reorganized into the 22nd Army Group, which he still commands, but which was later disarmed and transformed into "production corps." T'ao was elected to the CPPCC in 1951. He was a member of the NW MAC (later the Northwest Administrative Council) and in 1955, a member of the National Defense Council.

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701 Teng Pao-san: Army officer

A native of Kansu Province; dates unknown. 1927, deputy commander-in-chief of the Preparatory Army for National Construction under the command of General Feng Yu-hsiang, the Christian General. 1930, deputy commissioner in the Pacification Headquarters of Shensi Province. 1937, deputy commander of Suiyuan War Area under General Fu Tso-i, stationed in Paotou, Suiyuan; 1948, 1949, during the Communist advance in 1949 he gave up his city and fled. Later he defected from the Nationalists. Delegate to the CPPCC; appointed chairman in the People's Government of Kansu Province and re-elected to the same

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Wang, En-mao: Communist Party official

First secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP and after September 1955, first secretary of the Sinkiang Committee of the CCP. In 1950-52, member of the Northwest MAC.

Wang is the top party boss in Sinkiang and thus the actual ruler of that province. Unlike his colleagues, he holds no concurrent positions in the administration except for a couple of years as a member of the NW MAC. A man of mystery, little is known about him except that he is a native of Kiangsi and does not speak any of the native languages of Sinkiang, and that in 1933 he served in the CCP committee in the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Region under Jen Pi-shih.

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Wang Feng: Communist Party official

Native of Shensi Province and presently director of the Department of United Front Work in the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP. In the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, of which he was a member, he was a member of the Political and Legal Commission, the Land Reform Commission, and chairman of the Nationality Affairs Commission. He is also president of the Lanchou College of Nationalities.

Wang's main job was what the Communists called united front work, that is, the alignment of non-Communists to work with Communist cadres in the Northwest and to encourage non-Chinese to work with the Chinese. As director of the Department of United Front Work in the Party, he incorporated thousands of former Nationalist officials as well as students into the ranks of the cadres, to govern the vast territory of the Northwest that the Communists acquired in 1949. Later, he was responsible for the ideological reform and the purges of the cadres in 1952. As

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a Chinese heading the Commission of Nationality Affairs in the NW MAC, his job was to rationalize the long-standing differences between the Chinese and non-Chinese peoples in the Northwest. Much of the progress of socialist transformation in the Northwest depends upon the degrees to which Wang Feng at the regional level and Li Wei-han, director of the Department of United Front Work of the Central Committee, on the national have succeeded in smoothing relations between Communist and non-Communist officials, and between the Chinese and non-Chinese peoples.

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Wang, Shih-t'ai: Military and administrative official

Background unknown. 1934, member of the Central Executive Committee in the Chinese Soviet Government in Kiangsi and delegate to the Second All-China Representative Conference of

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159 Yang Tzu-lien: Democratic League member, government
631 official

A native of Shensi Province, dates unknown; member of the Northwest Headquarters of the Democratic League; 1950-1953, member of the Military and Administrative Council of the Northwest, chairman of the Political and Legal Committee, and director of the Board of Justice in that council. Since 1953, member of the Northwest Administrative Council and vice-chairman of the Political and Legal Committee; since 1951, member of the Central Committee of the Democratic League.

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159 Yolbash (Yolbars) Khan: Anti-Communist army officer and gov-
701 ernment official
631 Chinese name: Ching-fu

A Uighur, born in 1888 (or 1883) in Yingihissar in Kashgar. Orphaned as a child and reared by his elder sister. 1904, entered the service of the King of Qomul (Hami) as an inspector of the fifth rank; 1911, delegate to the Qomul City Assembly; 1922, promoted to a beg of the third rank; 1927, commissioner of communications in Qomul; 1930, general of the second rank (erh-p'in Ta Tu-t'ung); 1932, member of the Provincial Assembly; 1933, brigadier commander of mounted troops; 1935, magistrate of Qomul and garrison commander of Qomul; 1937, compelled to leave Sinkiang because of his anti-Soviet views; made lieutenant general and a member of the Military Council of the Nationalist Government; 1938, went to Chungking, became military councillor in the Administrative headquarters (hsing-ying); member of the board of directors of the Islamic National Salvation Association; 1945, member of the Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang; 1946, attended the People's Political Consultative Conference at Nanking; returned to Sinkiang as advisor to the Sinkiang Provincial Government; elected special commissioner for the Ninth District. Concurrently appointed advisor to the National Government; 1947, Administrative Supervisory Commissioner in the Qomul district; commander of peace preservation forces in the Qomul district; 1948, advisor on National policies in the office of the President in the National Government; 1949, deputy commander of the Peace Preservation Forces; 1950, commander in chief of the guerrilla forces in Sinkiang resisting the Communists; April 1950, Nationalist Government-appointed governor of Sinkiang; 1951, fled from Sinkiang to Formosa. Now advisor on national policies in the office of the President, National Government on Formosa.